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 POLARIZATION & EXTREMISM
RESEARCH & INNOVATION LAB



Transforming Insights Into Impacts

A 12-Month Longitudinal Study of the Parents & Caregivers Guide

Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (PERIL)

PERIL's mission is to utilize a public health approach to design, test and scale-up evidence-based tools and intervention strategies to prevent hate, bias and extremist radicalization.

Southern Poverty Law Center

The SPLC seeks to be a catalyst for racial justice in the South and beyond, working in partnership with communities to dismantle white supremacy, strengthen intersectional movements and advance the human rights of all people.

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Executive Summary

Project Overview

With the help of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), American University's Polarization & Extremism Research & Innovation Lab (PERIL) tracked the use and application of our *Building Resilience & Confronting Risk: A Parents & Caregivers Guide to Online Radicalization* (referred to from here on as the *P&C Guide*). The guide is designed to inform parents and help prevent the potential radicalization of their children in online spaces. Parents were tested every three months from November 2022 to November 2023 to understand how the impact of the *P&C Guide* changed over time. This study builds on a 2021 study of the *P&C Guide* that is available on PERIL's and SPLC's websites.

Background

Use of online spaces increased during the COVID pandemic, when in-person gatherings became difficult. The SPLC and PERIL developed the *P&C Guide* to equip parents with the knowledge of common online recruiting techniques used by white supremacists, neo-Nazis, the incel movement and other extremist groups. The SPLC and PERIL released and initially assessed the guide's usefulness in a single survey conducted at one time (i.e., cross-sectional). This study takes a more long-term view, allowing PERIL to study how well parents and caregivers remember the *P&C Guide* over time (i.e., longitudinal) by measuring what types of behaviors it prompted to determine when people begin to forget the contents and lessons of the guide.

Rationale

The SPLC and PERIL aim to produce tools that can be used in real-world settings, rather than strictly academic ones. Therefore, measuring readers' retention and continued use of the *P&C Guide* beyond their initial readings is crucial. PERIL and the SPLC aim to understand how people of different ages, races, political

affiliations, parenting styles and community groups consume and apply the *P&C Guide*, and for how long. We also aim to better understand the motivations and behaviors of parents and caregivers who use the guide over the course of a year. In doing so, we hope to develop better tools to prevent online youth radicalization.

Methods


PERIL collected five surveys (i.e., waves) from the same parents and caregivers over the course of a year, three months apart from each other, beginning in November 2022. More than 1,500 parents and caregivers started the program, and by the end, more than 700 were still participating.

PERIL developed a new system of testing the impact of this guide. This system measures parents' *awareness* of and *knowledge* about the warning signs of online radicalization, and their *willingness* to intervene directly in the process of radicalization.

Implications and Future Directions

Over the course of a year, after having read the *P&C Guide* only once, many parents were more knowledgeable about the warning signs of radicalization. Parents were also more willing to intervene with children they thought might be radicalizing. The *P&C Guide* successfully gave parents the skills to discuss youth radicalization not only with their children, but also with other parents and community members. This study found that political identity and parenting styles are strongly connected to the perceived usefulness of the guide for parents. In particular, parents who more strongly identify with the Democratic party and those who more often adopt an Authoritative parenting style — where parents balance love and support with clear boundaries and rules to foster responsible independence in children — were more likely to remember and utilize

Figure 1. Ways Parents and Caregivers Used the Guide



the guide to intervene with their children directly. This was unlike Permissive parenting styles, where parents may be nurturing and accepting but set few boundaries or rules, and it was unlike Authoritarian parenting styles, in which parents enforce strict rules and expect obedience without much dialogue or warmth. Both the Permissive and Authoritarian parenting styles saw less use of the guide than their Authoritative counterparts. Future studies should continue to evaluate the *P&C Guide* on a long-term basis — specifically, to measure what skills and knowledge are required for parents to remember and use information found in the *P&C Guide* over time. Future studies should also capture whether parents’ rereading of the *P&C Guide* boosts its effectiveness at increasing and maintaining awareness, knowledge and behavioral intentions regarding youth extremism over time.

Important Overall Findings:

- Parents’ knowledge of specific terms related to online radicalization saw an almost 50% increase over the course of the yearlong study.

- Parents’ ability to accurately remember the contents of the guide rose by almost 15% over the course of the yearlong study.
- Parents’ willingness to intervene in the process of online radicalization saw an almost 11% increase.
- 303 parents used information from the guide to take action to prevent youth from being recruited to extremism. Of these participants, 180 reported taking action to intervene once, 85 reported taking action twice, 32 took action three times, and six took action four times across the year of data collection.
- After reading the guide, 11% of parents either joined or created a group dedicated to monitoring youth radicalization.
- Parents who scored higher on the Authoritative parenting style were more knowledgeable about the contents of the guide. They also had a stronger tendency to intervene in the process of youth radicalization than those who scored

higher on Authoritarian and Permissive parenting styles.

- Parents who lived in rural areas tended to score higher on their knowledge of the contents of the *P&C Guide*.

Follow-up reinforcements, refresher sessions or continuous engagement strategies — particularly between one to three months post-guide follow-up — may help mitigate the decay phase and support sustained improvement.

Top-Line Qualitative Findings

- 78.4% of participants found the *P&C Guide* to be a useful tool to help begin conversations with their kids about radicalization.
- However, some participants continued to feel that discussing online radicalization was either inappropriate or that their children were not at risk.
- Some participants told us they were discouraged from joining or creating a group to keep track of children's online radicalization due to the controversial nature of discussing extremism in social settings.
- Some parents told us that their continued use of the *P&C Guide* helped them connect with other parents with similar concerns, creating a sense of community that participants felt was enriching.

Relevant Terminology

Longitudinal impact: In this study, we followed up with participants four times over 12 months. We showed the guide to parents only at the beginning of the study to create a baseline.

Baseline (i.e., Wave 1): This was the starting point. On this occasion, we tested participants before and after showing them the guide.

- **Pre-Guide:** Before reading the guide during baseline (i.e., Wave 1) testing.
- **Post-Guide:** After reading the guide during baseline (i.e., Wave 1) testing.

Wave 2: We tested participants three months after first testing them on the guide.

Wave 3: We tested participants for a second time, six months after first testing them on the guide.

Wave 4: We tested participants for a third time, nine months after first testing them on the guide.

Wave 5: We tested participants for a fourth time, 12 months after first testing them. This was the final follow-up with participants before concluding the study.

Extremism: Beliefs claiming that people of different racial or ethnic, gender or sexual, religious or political identities are in direct and unresolvable conflict. Extremists believe that this conflict between groups is inevitable and can only be resolved through separation, domination or violence. Extremism as it is defined here is the central tenet of all hate groups: “An organization or collection of individuals that attack or malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics.”¹

Radicalization: Any process that leads an individual to hold extremist beliefs.

Awareness: The ability to recognize keywords, concepts and ideas found in the guide.

Knowledge: The ability to correctly define or identify the correct answer about a word, concept or idea found in the guide.

- **Knowledge Accuracy:** The percentage of accurate answers a participant scores on multiple-choice questions testing their knowledge.

Action-Behavior Intention: The combined category of capacity, capability, confidence and willingness to intervene, used to assess intent to act upon the content learned from the guide.

- **Capacity:** Do participants know where to access resources?
- **Capability:** Do participants have the knowledge and skills necessary to help?
- **Confidence:** How confident are participants that they could effectively help?
- **Willingness:** How willing are participants to intervene directly on behalf of youth in preventing youth radicalization?

Key Findings

Quantitative Key Findings

Demographics Snapshot

In general, Democrats with higher levels of education and income, as well as more Authoritative parenting styles, scored higher on retaining awareness and knowledge about youth extremism from the guide.

Parental and Caregiver Role

- Caregivers who were older, cared for older children and cared for children beyond their own biological offspring were more likely to intervene in radicalization.

Gender

- Female participants tended to have higher awareness levels over time, while males tended to have higher knowledge accuracy scores over time.


Race and Ethnicity

- While white parents tended to score better on testing related to the guide, Black/African American parents were more likely to intervene directly in radicalization.

Geographic Density


- Participants who lived in less dense (i.e., more rural) residential geographic environments tended to have higher knowledge accuracy scores. Geographic density was not strongly associated with awareness or behavior intention scores.

Figure 2. Role as Parent/Caregiver



Final Participant Count at Wave 5: 715

Figure 3. Awareness of Youth Radicalization and Extremism Terminology Over Time



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the Parents & Caregivers Guide. Awareness at each wave is a sum total across 12 radicalization and extremism terms to which participants indicated whether they had ever heard the word or phrase with either 0 = No, 1 = Unsure or 2 = Yes. Higher scores indicate greater overall awareness of radicalization and extremism terms and phrases. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

Change in awareness of youth radicalization and extremism terminology over time:

- Caregivers quickly learned common extremist terms such as “content rabbit holes,” “The Great Replacement” and “The Boogaloo” from reading the guide.²

As captured in Figure 3 above, parents’ awareness of words and phrases used in the guide increased almost 50% over the course of the year.

- Increased by 24% on average during baseline (Wave 1) testing, comparing awareness levels of participants before and after reading the guide during baseline testing.*
- Decreased by 15.2% between baseline Wave 1 and three months (Wave 2).*
- Increased by 20.4% from Wave 2 through to 12 months (Wave 5) post-guide.*


Does taking care of more children correlate with awareness?

Between the first testing and three months later (i.e., Wave 1 and 2), it does not. However, parents and caregivers who take care of more children had a greater increase in awareness from three to 12 months after the post-guide testing. This might suggest that the longer someone cares for multiple children, the more aware they are of words and phrases related to radicalization, implying that the parental experience gained by caring for multiple children is a positive factor.

Change in accuracy of knowledge about youth radicalization and extremism over time:

Reading the guide immediately made parents more knowledgeable about many factors related to extremism including warning signs, understanding the causes of radicalization and responding to hate speech and youth radicalization.

Figure 4. Accuracy of Knowledge About Youth Radicalization and Extremism Over Time



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the Parents & Caregivers Guide. Knowledge accuracy at each wave consists of the percentage of 10 multiple-choice questions participants answered correctly, two about each of the following: online radicalization content; recognizing warning signs; understanding the drivers of radicalization; relevant websites, platforms and apps; and how to respond to hate and get help. Higher scores indicate greater knowledge accuracy. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

As captured in Figure 4, parents’ knowledge accuracy of the guide’s contents increased by 13.3% on average over the course of the year.

- Increased by 11% at the start (Wave 1) from pre-guide to post-guide testing.*
- Decreased by 6.5% from Wave 1 post-guide to three months later (Wave 2).*
- Increased by a total of 3% from three months to 12 months (Wave 5).*
- Parents who were more knowledgeable about youth radicalization and extremism also reported that their children spent less time online, on average.

Change in behavioral intention to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism over time:

At each wave, the study posed questions about parents’ capacity, capability, confidence and willingness to intervene in youth radicalization. PERIL created an overall score by averaging answers together. There was


a modest but immediate increase in these intentions after reading the guide.

Intentions to intervene with a child regarding extremism or radicalization on average:

- Increased by 8% between pre- and post-guide assessments at Wave 1.*
- Decreased by about 4.8% from the end of Wave 1 to three months (Wave 2).*
- There was no significant change in parents’ intention to intervene from three months to 12 months (Wave 5), suggesting parents’ intentions stabilized after their baseline post-guide assessment.

As captured in Figure 6 (see also Figure 7), parents who worry more about youth psychological safety had stronger intentions to intervene in radicalization.

Figure 5. Intentions to Intervene in Youth Radicalization and Extremism Over Time



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the Parents & Caregivers Guide. Behavioral intentions at each wave is an average across questions assessing capacity, capability, confidence, willingness and intentions to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism. Higher scores indicate greater behavioral intentions to engage. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6. Average Concern for Youth Psychological Safety in Environments





Figure 7: Average Concern for Youth Psychological Safety in Environments by Political Identity

0=Not at all concerned, 1=A little concerned, 2=Somewhat concerned, 3=Quite a bit concerned, 4=A great deal concerned


When online




At extracurriculars




At school




At sports




With friends




At home



In the state



Other




Practical Application and Usefulness:

In this study, PERIL also tested participants on how they were applying what they learned from the guide. This included how useful they felt the guide was, what information was most useful, and in what situations or environments respondents used the guide. PERIL also tested whether participants applied information from the guide during conversations about the guide they had with others and where those conversations were held. Thirty-six percent of participants reported sharing information they learned with others. Of those conversations:

- About 20% of participants used information from the guide to take action to prevent youth from being recruited to extremism.
- Almost 11% created or joined a group focused on preventing online radicalization.
- More than half of these conversations were with biological children, extended family or with friends of their children (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. With Whom Parents and Caregivers Had These Conversations



Qualitative Key Findings

PERIL asked participants multiple open-ended questions throughout the study to better understand how, where and why the guide was used, and what factors influenced their use of the guide.

These questions included:


- How the guide impacted their willingness to engage with youth on issues of extremism.
- If conversations were held with children on issues of extremism, we asked, “How did these conversations go?”
- If the respondent noted that they were not willing to have those conversations, we asked them, “Why not?” and/or “What would increase their future willingness?”

Useful and Empowering:

Most participants shared positive responses, saying that the guide is a useful resource. In particular, they highlighted how the guide:

- Helped them start conversations.
- Empowered caregivers in their roles.
- Created opportunities for future talks with their youth.

Figure 9. Where Conversations Took Place



Hesitant and Unsure:

Some parents shared hesitations about talking with youth.

They brought up such concerns as:

- Not feeling qualified to hold conversations.
- Not wanting to overstep their role if they were not the child's parent.
- Being unsure how to start conversations.
- Children potentially not taking the conversations seriously.

Feels Unnecessary:

Of the participants willing to hold conversations, some did not believe conversations were needed, sharing feelings such as:

- These topics were inappropriate for children of various ages.
- They did not believe their children were at risk of engaging with extremist material.

Other Concerns:

A small number of respondents were unwilling to talk with youth on issues of extremism. They discussed concerns such as:

- Feeling that girls were not at risk.
- Fears of retaliation in their community.
- Believing the guide contributed to left-wing propaganda.

Joined or Created a Group:

We also asked parents if they were prompted to create, join or engage in any groups that discussed issues of youth radicalization and extremism. Those who did join or create a group were asked to describe their experiences, and those who had not joined or created a group were asked if they had a particular reason why not.

Participants who reported having joined or

“I would tell their parents [if I were concerned] instead of lecturing them myself.”

Research Participant

“I was not willing to engage with youth. I feel like my kids are not old enough to be exposed to this sort of stuff.”

Research Participant

“I was not willing to discuss things because I did not want backlash from anyone on either side of the situation. I needed to protect myself first.”

Research Participant

created a group were generally enthusiastic and positive about their experiences. They described the groups as:

- Functioning as casual social outlets.
- Creating space for discussions and sharing of information.

Notably, only one individual described their group engaging in activism.

Barriers to Joining or Creating a Group:

Most parents did not join any sort of group, and only a few were opposed to joining one. Common reasons for not joining a group varied:

- Not having time or energy.
- A lack of information or knowledge.

- Believing that extremism is not an issue in their community.
- Fears of retaliation for discussing extremism in social spaces.

“I created a group in my place of worship ... I made sure that [we] share quality time with people of like minds.”

Research Participant

“I feel like I am not an expert so I would not want to join a group just yet.”

Research Participant

“...I do not want to stand out in the community...I prefer to keep myself and my family low profile. I hope others in other areas can and do...”

Research Participant



Discussion

The SPLC and PERIL set out to understand the mental and social impacts of our *P&C Guide* over the course of a year. As discussed to this point, we found that reading the guide made parents immediately more knowledgeable on common extremist terminology, how radicalization happens and how to properly intervene.

Quantitative Findings

Parenting Style

We examined a range of different factors that could contribute to parental awareness of the risks of radicalization for youth. Parenting style proved to be one of the most important of these predictors. After a full year of participation in the study, PERIL administered questions from the Parenting Styles and Dimensions Questionnaire assessing Authoritarian, Authoritative and Permissive parenting styles (Hart et al. 2001). Authoritarian parenting features parents enforcing strict rules and expecting obedience without much dialogue or warmth. Authoritative parenting features strict rules and firm boundaries combined with open communication and supportive guidance. Permissive parenting features nurturing and acceptance while setting few boundaries or rules. Importantly, parents do not always stick to one style, and many parents switch back and forth between styles (Smetana 2017).

PERIL used advanced data-driven statistical analyses to organize and create categories for different parenting styles based on their responses to multiple scale items. Parents were then assigned to the parenting style category in which they scored highest. We found that Authoritative parents tended to have more accurate knowledge of topics related to youth radicalization and had stronger intentions to intervene

when recognizing their own children being radicalized, compared to both Authoritarian and Permissive parents.

This could be for several reasons. Authoritative parents often have much more open communication with their kids than Authoritarian parents, allowing them to more easily notice changes in their child's behavior. Authoritative parents and caregivers may also be more likely to relate with their children's struggles, helping them understand the root feelings of anger and disconnection that could lead to radicalization. Authoritative parents tend to provide more supportive guidance with boundaries that may provide better structure for youth, thus guiding them toward positive behaviors and away from harmful influences like extremist views. Authoritative parents may be more likely to encourage independent thinking, which could encourage children to question extremist views and seek parental guidance when faced with confusing situations. Lastly, Authoritative parents and caregivers may be more likely to believe in their ability to influence their children's decisions positively. This belief may be fostered by both the emotional connection and the structures that they have built with their children, which in turn could lead more to a desire to intervene. These results make it clear how important parenting styles are in driving parents' and caregivers' views and uses of the guide over time.

Political Identity

Another consistent finding across this yearlong study was the importance of political identity. In general, Democrats were far more likely to be aware of and intervene in the process of radicalization than Republicans. Given the growing political divide and the spread of politics into every aspect of domestic life, understanding and addressing behaviors motivated by political identity is crucial.

The connection between parents' and caregivers' politics and their knowledge of and desire to intervene in youth radicalization involves a mixture of social, cultural and psychological factors. Recent research suggests that there are certain tendencies. In this study, political party affiliation appeared to have connections to different parenting styles. Parents and caregivers who scored higher on Authoritative parenting style, for example, tended to be Democrats, while those who scored higher on Authoritarian and Permissive parenting styles tended to be Republicans, though the differences were small. Importantly, Democrats, Republicans and Independents in our sample all scored highest on Authoritative parenting, relative to other parenting styles.

Research has found that individuals with a liberal ideology tend to score higher on the Big Five personality trait of openness to new experiences including diverse perspectives and ideas (Jonason 2014). Among Democrats, this openness might translate into greater intention to engage with the topic of youth radicalization, in turn leading to greater knowledge on the subject. Like the Authoritative parenting style, Democratic-leaning parents might prioritize inclusive and open-ended discussions about sensitive topics (e.g., politics, religion, social issues). Such willingness can encourage children to share their own thoughts and concerns more freely, making parents more aware of their children's online experiences and risks of radicalization.

Contemporary talking points associated with the Democratic Party often emphasize social justice, equality and inclusivity, which may make Democratic-leaning parents more attuned to digital content and messaging that touches on issues of inequality and marginalization. This heightened sensitivity to such messaging could lead to more knowledge about extremism and a greater desire to intervene if parents feel their child is at risk of radicalization. Online radicalization as a concept has become politicized, and some of its connected political issues like digital content moderation, censoring hate speech and deplatforming certain content

creators have become part of a larger cultural divide that might affect the perceived threat. Importantly, these are broad trends and not universal truths. Numerous individual, cultural, educational and personal factors play a role in shaping parents' views on youth radicalization regardless of their political identity. Nonetheless, political goals, motivations and narratives shape how people of different political parties perceive and process information, including how parents and caregivers viewed and used the guide (Van Bavel and Pereira 2018). These factors are, therefore, important to consider when developing similar resources and ensuring the guide is useful to all parents and caregivers.

Association Between Knowledge and Willingness To Engage


Of the four behavior intention metrics (i.e., capacity, capability, confidence, willingness), the association between knowledge and willingness was strongest. This suggests that as one's knowledge and understanding of online radicalization increases, so too does one's willingness to talk with youth about digital hate and ways to prevent radicalization. On the other hand, as a parent's knowledge of online radicalization decreases, so does their willingness to discuss the topic. While that may seem obvious, this finding factually connects the knowledge gained by reading the guide to the most crucial behavioral outcome measured: one's actual willingness to have a conversation. There appears to be a cascading effect: As a person begins to forget their newly acquired knowledge, they become less confident in their ability to talk about online radicalization, which then leads to them being less willing to engage in conversation with youth.

By studying this association over a full year, we see from our data that the first three months after reading the guide is when most people lose the most knowledge (see Figure 4). This suggests that a time-specific intervention, i.e., a "booster," during that window could help parents and caregivers retain the information from the guide long-term.

Joining or Creating a Group To Better Understand Youth Radicalization

One of the most exciting findings from

Figure 4. Accuracy of Knowledge About Youth Radicalization and Extremism Over Time



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the Parents & Caregivers Guide. Knowledge accuracy at each wave consists of the percentage of 10 multiple-choice questions participants answered correctly, two about each of the following: online radicalization content; recognizing warning signs; understanding the drivers of radicalization; relevant websites, platforms and apps; and how to respond to hate and get help. Higher scores indicate greater knowledge accuracy. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

this impact study is that reading this guide motivated almost 16% of parents to join or create a group focused on youth radicalization. In some cases, respondents said that they joined or created a group on youth radicalization to discuss and debate the topic with parents at their school. Others found community with other parents and caregivers similarly concerned about online radicalization. These groups met in person and online, with some groups focused on the harmful effects of social media broadly. Others discussed online safety practices specifically, and others discussed cyberbullying and teenage loneliness/isolation.

We saw the largest number of groups joined or created during Wave 1 of our longitudinal assessment, i.e., the first three months after reading the guide. However, it is not clear whether that is because of participants dropping out of the study itself, or if parents were riding the initial momentum of their newfound increase in knowledge. Regardless, PERIL and the SPLC designed the *P&C Guide*

to motivate such action-oriented outcomes, so this finding will help focus future iterations toward greater successes.

Fear of backlash or being targeted by extremists emerged as an important obstacle

“I was not willing to discuss things because I did not want backlash from anyone on either side of the situation. I needed to protect myself first.”

Research Participant

to joining or creating a group. One respondent said: “I don’t like doing things like that. Creating groups that can pose a threat to myself or my family.” This speaks to both the legitimate fears of extremist groups in

this current political climate, and the ways that connected identities can determine how one acts on information around extremism. A parent from a historically marginalized or targeted group may be just as interested in learning about the prevention of radicalization as anyone else, but their participation in a formal group may feel too risky or draw too much attention to themselves and their children. This highlights the value of a digital resource like this guide, which can be accessed anonymously and at any time.

Using Guide To Interrupt Radicalization Process


Another example of the guide’s benefits is the finding that almost 10% of parents used the information in the guide to take action to prevent youth from being radicalized (see Figure 1). This is another outcome that demonstrates the real-world benefit of a resource that aims to increase both knowledge

and intention to act. Simply giving language to parents and caregivers that helps them recognize extremist group recruitment strategies along with sites, platforms and apps that are potentially dangerous can provide an entry point into a conversation around radicalization, extremism and the existence of bad-faith actors trying to spread misinformation to youth.

Qualitative Findings

Researchers discovered many interesting and important findings related to how the guide helped participants have productive, meaningful conversations about online radicalization with the youth in their lives. Participants also shared obstacles to such conversations.

Figure 1. Ways Parents and Caregivers Used the Guide



The guide was generally well received (see Figure 15 in the Appendix on guide satisfaction/usefulness) and seen as a helpful resource for raising the topic of online radicalization. In particular, parents and caregivers noted that the guide empowered them and opened avenues for further communication with youth. Parents used the guide to discuss situations their own children had experienced, and found the sense of community and shared experience enriching and valuable. They shared strategies, platforms or settings they were particularly concerned about, and used the information found in the guide as a jumping-off point for conversations among friends, family and other parents about youth radicalization and digital safety practices.

One obstacle we observed in initiating conversations on radicalization with youth was the mentality that only parents should be discussing a topic like this with young people. For example, one respondent stated, “I would be less comfortable [talking about radicalization] with other children unless I was in an ‘in loco parentis’ role.” Given how politically divisive the topic of online radicalization has become, and the fact that contemporary parenting norms in the U.S. tend to be more focused on the individual than the collective, some respondents felt that broaching the topic with their child’s friend, friends or extended family would be overstepping (Putnam and Gartstein 2019). This finding gives PERIL and the SPLC insight into future messaging opportunities to promote the idea that sometimes non-caregivers are better messengers for topics like this. For example, a football coach might have the ear of a teenage boy in ways that his mother or father do not. This kind of approach is already found in *Building Networks & Addressing Harm: A Community Guide to Online Radicalization*, which PERIL and the SPLC developed after the *P&C Guide* for exactly this reason — to equip non-parental caregivers with a similar set of tools to address radicalization in the lives of young people.

Some respondents felt that it was too early for them to have these kinds of conversations with their children (“I was not willing to

“I joined this group on Reddit...I use [it] a lot... and I’m thankful for finding something like this because it’s a treasure trove of golden information.”

Research Participant

engage with youth. I feel like my kids are not old enough to be exposed to this sort of stuff”). Others felt that their children were already protected by the preinstalled parental controls on their kids’ devices (“I haven’t engaged with my child about extremism after reading the guide because it hasn’t come up and he has many parental controls on his devices that access the internet”). Still others felt that their child was too smart to be manipulated by propaganda (“I didn’t have a conversation because I don’t believe my children are exposed to that kind of thing. The one who’s old enough to understand stuff like that knows better, and I genuinely don’t think he would fall for that kind of manipulation”). Each of these arguments is flawed in its own way: 1) Parents deeply underestimate how early and frequently children are exposed to white supremacist and male supremacist content on social media, video games and online forums. 2) Parental controls are easily bypassed and often fail to block significant amounts of problematic content. 3) The idea that smart or moral people do not fall for manipulation and propaganda is disproven by scientific research.

Similarly, some parents and caregivers wanted to wait until their child was exposed to hateful online content — even displaying signs of radicalization — before addressing the issue. This points to the need for prevention-focused language in future resources and iterations of the guide. Waiting until your child starts to repeat extremist talking points means that the youth has already gone too far, and it is

counter to the public-health approach that PERIL promotes.

Gender also became a factor when it came to hesitancy to discuss radicalization of youth. There was a sense that online radicalization happens only to boys or that boys are specifically and uniquely susceptible to supremacist propaganda. While it is true that extremist groups are made up mostly of men, there is growing concern about the ways in which girls and women are being radicalized into ideologies based in hate, conspiracy theories and misinformation (Mattheis 2018).

Most people who discussed these issues with their own children did so at home or in their car. This helps clarify the setting and nature of these conversations, as well as what might be helpful to include in a conversation protocol in future resources or iterations of the guide. While there was some hesitancy around a lack of preparation to have a complex conversation with their kids, most parents reported feeling better prepared and better equipped to have a productive conversation about youth radicalization after reading the guide.

Shape and Pattern of Impact Over Time

After an immediate boost to awareness, knowledge, and an intention to intervene from reading the guide, each measurement decreased between the initial post-guide testing and three months later. From there, awareness and knowledge accuracy increased back to where they had been immediately after parents first read the guide. Intention for parents to intervene in youth radicalization remained stable.

This pattern of an initial spike, followed by a drop, then gradual increase in awareness and knowledge is consistent with theories of learning and memory consolidation, such as the “spacing effect” in learning where practice over time leads to better long-term retention (Cepeda et al. 2006). The similar pattern across outcomes suggests a robust impact of the guide in consistently influencing multiple related constructs.

“[After discussing why she doesn’t need to speak to her granddaughter]...this problem isn’t as big with girls...”

Research Participant

These patterns could be due to several factors:

- Immediate effect Wave 1 pre to post: The immediate increase in awareness, knowledge and behavioral intentions is likely due to the direct impact of reading the guide.
- Decrease from Wave 1 post to Wave 2: This decrease is consistent with the “forgetting curve” where information tends to be lost over time when not used or reinforced (Murre and Dros 2015).
- A second possible explanation for this decrease is “regression to the mean,” which is an occurrence in statistics that can cause initially high or low measurements to move closer to the average when tested again.
- Gradual increase from Wave 2 to Wave 5: There are several potential explanations for this increase in awareness and knowledge:
 - Sleeper effect: Sometimes information has a delayed impact as people process and integrate it over time (Hovland and Weiss 1951).
 - Repeated testing effects: The act of being repeatedly asked the same questions might reinforce learning and recall over time (Roediger and Karpicke 2006).
 - Application: Participants might be applying what they learned from the guide in their everyday lives, which reinforces knowledge over time.

- The Frequency Illusion (i.e., the Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon): People will notice a specific concept, word or product more frequently after recently being made aware of it (Zwicky 2005). After reading the guide, parents and caregivers could have become more attuned to situations where online radicalization is being discussed or could be occurring, paying more attention to media coverage of online radicalization or better recognizing extremist talking points they encounter.
- Participant dropout: Over a yearlong trial, people are bound to drop out. As participants leave, those who remain in the study might differ from those who drop out or lessen their engagement. This can change how the data presents itself.
- External influences: Events that occur outside the study can influence how participants perceive and respond to different questions. These external factors, such as major political events and media coverage, especially related to youth radicalization like mass shootings, can contribute to changes in outcomes over time.
- Behavioral intentions remaining stable: This could indicate that while knowledge and awareness continue to grow after initial reading of the guide, translating this awareness and knowledge into intentions to act might require additional interventions or time.

Given our pattern of findings, tailoring interventions to include follow-up reinforcements, refresher sessions or continuous engagement strategies — particularly between one to three months post-guide follow-up — can help prevent parents’ knowledge of radicalization from decreasing and even lead to steady improvement. Also, employing a system that accounts for these changes, such as using multiple follow-up assessments and controlling for external influences, may provide a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of the guide over time.

Limitations

There are a few important limitations to this impact study that need to be addressed. As with any longitudinal assessment, events from the outside world can have a significant impact on the patterns in data over time. There could be newsworthy events over the past year that have affected respondents’ memory of the information found in the guide, as well as their intentions to intervene in youth online extremism. Events like mass shootings and hate crimes bring media attention to issues around media literacy, questions about censorship and the impact of social media content. It is possible that participants in our impact study heard about these situations, and as a result the significance of the guide’s topic and specific content was more salient in their minds. Any number of news events related to extremism may have affected whether and how parents used what they learned from the guide. Parents also may feel pressure to report that they feel stronger about issues that have to do with their child and radicalization, or they may feel guilty if they do not say they are willing to talk with their children about radicalization. Even if the study is anonymous, participants may have a motivation not to be thought of as apathetic or uneducated. They may therefore report greater post-test awareness, capability, etc., to save face or even convince themselves that they understand the content of the guide better than they really do.

There is also the possibility of experimenter bias. The benchmarks for assessment established the information we were looking for (i.e., an increase in awareness, knowledge, capacity, capability, confidence, willingness and others). Participants who understand this will sometimes report the answers they think researchers want them to give rather than how they truly think or feel. Without a control group, we cannot be sure if the increase in metrics of Waves 3 to 5 was simply due to repeatedly asking participants the same questions, i.e., practice (test-retest) effects. However, this risk is somewhat offset by the fact that parents were only shown the guide once during the study and were never given the correct answers to the knowledge questions.

As is true with any study relying on online survey participants, this study was not probability-based. It was not representative of the general public. Parents/caregivers who sign up for online panels and agree to participate in studies like this may be measurably different from parents who would not be willing to sign up or participate. Finally, we only measured up to one year later; it is unknown how long these effects could last after that or if some new pattern in the data would emerge after one year.

Future Directions

Future versions of this study of resources will have to include a control group that only has data collected at baseline and final wave. This would address the problem of testing effects, i.e., the extent to which reading familiar questions and recognizing answer choices repeatedly affects results. Also, participants should be asked about the news they consumed during the study. This could offer insight into what events might affect how participants engage with the study.

A more effective way to assess the practical applicability of the guide's content would require a change to our current methods. In future longitudinal assessments of resources — sample size allowing — a portion of study participants could be allowed to refer to the guide or have the guide presented at each wave of data collection. Then, the assessment could be shaped around the application of material in the guide in novel, open-ended situations rather than simply recalling the information over time. Allowing for this more applicable method of assessing *understanding* beyond just *awareness* or *knowledge* could help us improve the guide.

Lastly, future studies should look at how these resources affect people over long periods. Future studies could also use stricter methods to choose participants. And future studies should aim for more representative samples to ensure findings are both reliable and applicable to the population at large.

Conclusion

The purpose of studying the impact of the *P&C Guide* over time is to understand if, when and in what ways parents' retention of information from the guide decreases, and what behaviors the guide motivates. What we have found is that reading our guide immediately improves awareness and knowledge of online extremism, and the capability, confidence and willingness of parents and caregivers who read it to intervene — and that those gains hold over the course of a year. Parents and caregivers continue to remember the information and apply the skills they learned in the guide with the youth in their lives.

Assessing the impact of resources over a full year allows researchers to understand what information in the guide stays with parents, what information and skills need to be

reinforced and — most crucially — when that reinforcement needs to happen. This kind of long-term study also reduces the burden on any individual assessment over the course of a year.

By conducting this study longitudinally, we are establishing a kind of knowledge that is not found in other prevention-based work in the field of extremism: understanding how and in what ways a resource is used in conversations with youth over time, and where those conversations happen and when. The guide motivated a significant number of people to work with each other, and to reach out and organize against the radicalization of the children in their lives to white supremacy, male supremacy, conspiracy theories and hateful ideologies.



Appendix A: Methodology

Survey Design

As a longitudinal study, PERIL conducted an initial survey (Wave 1) to establish baseline levels of information and behavioral intentions with regard to youth radicalization, with a pre- and post-test of content presented from the guide, as well as additional post-test surveys at the three-month (Wave 2), six-month (Wave 3), nine-month (Wave 4) and 12-month (Wave 5) follow-up windows. Researchers expected attrition between all survey waves to be as high as 50% to 60%. Baseline (Wave 1) final sample size was $N = 1,556$. The three-month (Wave 2) follow-up had a final sample of $N = 1,211$, a retention rate of 77.8% from baseline. At six months (Wave 3), the final sample size was $N = 1,103$, a retention rate of 70.9% from Wave 1 and 91.1% from Wave 2. At nine months (Wave 4), the final sample size was $N = 888$, a retention rate of 57.1% from Wave 1, 73.3% from Wave 2, and 80.5% from Wave 3. Lastly, the 12-month (Wave 5) final sample size was $N = 715$, a retention rate of 46.0% from Wave 1, 59.0% from Wave 2, 64.8% from Wave 3, and 80.5% from Wave 4. At each wave, researchers removed participants who sped through the survey faster than one-third of the median survey duration time ($n = 61$ across waves; 3.9% of participants). Attrition analysis suggested that the only statistically significant difference in dropout rate by participant demographics was at Wave 3, when younger and Hispanic/Latinx (compared to white) parents and caregivers were more likely to drop out.

The baseline (Wave 1) survey included items measuring how parents and caregivers interact with youth, a pre-and post-test of content presented from the guide that included items on awareness, knowledge and action-behavior intentions (i.e., capacity, capability, confidence, willingness), items on demographics and political ideology and post-test wrap-up items covering participants' experiences reading the guide. Waves 2-5 did not include a pre-test, and only included

a post-test on awareness, knowledge and action-behavior intention items. These subsequent waves did not include excerpts from the guide, as the longitudinal study aimed to test the “stickiness” of knowledge, and behavior changes resulting from reading the guide during the initial baseline wave. General self-efficacy was only measured at three months (Wave 2), and research questions did not anticipate self-efficacy significantly changing over time during this study. The following questions were only asked at baseline and Wave 2, as research questions did not look at how levels associated with each question changed over time:

- How often, if ever, do you take care of any minor(s) under the age of 18?
- For what reason(s) do you typically take care of any minors under the age of 18 as a primary caregiver?
- How many minors under the age of 18 do you take care of, including those outside your household?
- How many minors under the age of 18 who you take care of live in your household?
- How old (in years) are each of the minors you take care of?

In addition, researchers changed language in the post-test action-behavior intentions free response question to “Sometimes it is hard to have difficult conversations with others about conspiracy theories, misinformation, extremism and extremists. If you were willing to engage on issues of extremism with youth after reading the guide, how did it go? If you were not willing to engage with youth on these issues, why not? What would make you more willing in the future?” This change allows researchers to probe what would help participants become more willing if they were not already.

Each subsequent wave following Wave 1 included the following changes:

- An additional response option for the group creating and/or joining question between the previous three-month period.
- Updated language from “three month” to “six month” to “nine month” to “12 month” throughout the survey.

The following minor changes were also performed during the survey development of the Wave 3 (six-month) wave:

- Two additional questions were added to the Practical Application section of the Wave 3 survey that included: “What was the physical location where this conversation or conversations occurred?” and “Please describe the situation(s) where you used the information in the guide, and/or how the conversation went?”

The following minor changes were also incorporated during the survey development of the Wave 4 (nine-month) wave.

- Disabling the copy/paste functions on the Qualtrics survey with the exception of entering in the participant’s Prolific ID. Researchers did so in response to a series of text-based responses in the practical application section (~30) that were identified as potentially being AI-driven responses that these participants may have used to speed through the survey and not have to create their own answers.
- The question “Please describe the situation(s) where you used the information in the guide, and/or how the conversation went” was cut from the Practical Application Section. This choice was made to limit response fatigue.
- The question “Since reading the guide, have you joined or created a group that discusses issues of youth radicalization and extremism? If not, why not?” was rephrased under the Practical Application Section to “Since reading the guide, have you joined or created a group that

discusses issues of youth radicalization and extremism? If not, was there a particular reason why, or was there a different type of action you took?” to better understand what other things participants may have done in response to reading the guide.

- Researchers updated the survey logic for the following question: “What was the physical location where this conversation or conversations occurred?” Participants now received this question if “not at all” is not selected, whereas before it appeared if any option were selected.

- Updated the linked PDF consent page.
- Added an error message for participants who tried to copy and paste responses.

The Wave 5 (12-month) survey included additional minor changes outlined below:

- Added an additional question asking parents, “Have any of your children/minors ever been clinically diagnosed by a doctor or psychologist with any of the following?”
- Follow-up question added asking, “Was this diagnosis made within the past 12 months?”
- Included section asking about parenting styles and dimensions, a 14-question scale (PSDQ-Short).

Participants and Demographics

Researchers initially recruited a total of 1,556 participants from the Prolific survey recruitment platform to participate in the first (initial/baseline Wave 1) wave of this study. These participants identified as parents or caregivers of youth in one or more of the following capacities.

1. For family (e.g., grandchildren, nieces, nephews, cousins, etc.).
2. For adopted children.
3. For stepchildren/My partner’s children.
4. For biological children.

Participant Recruitment

Recruitment for this study occurred in phases. In the first phase, researchers ran a custom screener question on the Prolific platform. This screener also asked participants to self-report their Prolific ID numbers, used to match demographics and response data collected by Prolific with survey responses of the *Wave 1 Impact Study Survey* and hosted on the Qualtrics survey platform. A split male-female sample of 9,000 potential participants was recruited for this custom screener, which was made available on Prolific's platform to respondents who live in the U.S. and who self-identified as fluent in English. All respondents on Prolific are individuals 18 and older. This initial screener question asked respondents:

- Do you take care of any minors under the age of 18 as a parent, guardian, or primary caregiver (e.g., biological or foster parent, legal guardian, other family member with primary caregiver responsibilities of youth, etc.)?
 - No
 - Yes
 - Unsure/Other

Of the 9,000 respondents captured in the custom screener, only 2,736 were eligible to participate in the study. Once PERIL published the *Wave 1 Impact Study* on Prolific, the study became available to those 2,736 individuals only, as part of the custom allowlist. A total of 1,664 participants responded to the survey out of the 2,736 individuals eligible to take the survey on Prolific. After cleaning the data, the final sample size for *Wave 1 of Parents & Caregivers Longitudinal Impact Study* included 1,556 participants.

Of the 1,556 participants included in *Wave 1* of this study, 1,211 participants returned to participate in *Wave 2* of this study (three-month interval) after the sample was cleaned of incomplete responses and duplicates. With an original expected attrition rate of 25% for each previous wave, our expected sample size of *Wave 2* was 1,150. During this wave, attrition was less of an issue than expected, which helped ensure a healthy sample size throughout the study. Of the 1,211 participants who returned to participate

in *Wave 2* (three-month interval), 1,103 participants returned to participate in *Wave 3* (six-month interval) after the sample was cleaned of incomplete responses and duplicates. Attrition after the six-month window was 33.3%, with 1,103 participants in *Wave 3* leaving this estimate still reasonably accurate. Of the 1,103 participants who returned to participate in *Wave 3*, 888 participants took part in *Wave 4* after the sample was cleaned of incomplete responses and duplicates. Attrition can roughly be estimated at just over 200 participants lost in each wave. Our final *Wave 5* (12-month) garnered 715 participants, higher than the end of initial attrition expectations of 60%. PERIL increased compensation by a 50% rate of response time for each wave.

PERIL built and developed this impact study on the Qualtrics online survey platform, which is used for survey hosting and data collection.

Appendix B: Qualitative Results

Across the longitudinal study, parents shared positive responses about the guide, saying it was an informative resource that helped them navigate conversations about extremism and mis/disinformation with their children.

- “The guide was extremely beneficial in bridging the gap with my teenage son and opening a conversation with him regarding conspiracy theories, extremism, meme misinformation, etc. It went well overall. I feel that he knows if something questionable is brought up either among his friend group, at school or online that he is safe to talk to me about it. I have made it abundantly clear to my son that I would never judge him or put him down for asking me questions, but rather, I’d be thankful to him for doing so. It shows that he is making good decisions and is growing up to think for himself. I know my ex-husband also has been very open with our son regarding talking about things like racial memes and increasing the amount of supervision he has when our son uses his computer at my ex-husband’s house.”
- “In the group we have shared the resources guide with others who are interested in helping to stop the spread of this information and these groups. We have enabled each other to be more informed and capable of having nuanced discussions with others about the sensitive topic.”

Across the longitudinal study, some parents shared concerns about not feeling qualified or having the disposition to talk about these subjects. Similarly, some participants wished for additional knowledge or local support.

- “I think there are more qualified people to lead the way on these kinds of things. It’s all somewhat new to me.”
- “I’m not even sure I understand and could identify extremism and extremists myself,

so it would be a little difficult to discuss it with someone else.”

- “Community support would make me more likely to talk to youth about these issues.”
- “Right now, I feel like I lack some of the expertise necessary to discuss such topics. I think I could mess up during the conversation. I might try and talk about how radical ideas have done nothing but harm our society throughout history, but I think I should be more knowledgeable on each specific conspiracy theory that the child or teenager has engaged in.”

Across the longitudinal study, some parents were concerned about introducing the topic to children at younger ages. Others specifically mentioned concerns about exposing their children to these subject matters at an inappropriate age.

- “I am willing but my daughter is 11 months old and the kids I teach are six. I don’t want to bring something up if they (thankfully) have not yet been exposed to it.”
- “I was not willing to engage with youth. I feel like my kids are not old enough to be exposed to this sort of stuff.”

Across the longitudinal study, numerous parents felt that having discussions with their children about these topics was not necessary because their children were already knowledgeable or the parents felt they had no other reason to be concerned.

- “We didn’t discuss these things directly. There isn’t that great a current threat. We did discuss things that were tangential, like identifying true information, and separating facts from opinions. It is an ongoing conversation, and I expect it to keep developing in the future.”
- “I haven’t engaged with my child about extremism after reading the guide because

it hasn't come up, and he has many parental controls on his devices that access the internet."

- "I didn't have a conversation because I don't believe my children are exposed to that kind of thing. The one who's old enough to understand stuff like that knows better, and I genuinely don't think he would fall for that kind of manipulation."

Some parents talked about their children not taking the discussion seriously in Wave 5.

- "I was willing to engage in issues of extremism with youth after reading the guide, and it became interesting to say the least. While I was discussing it with them, I could see that they were not really taking me seriously. At the end of the day, this generation of youth is so heavily integrated into technology and constantly becoming desensitized to extremism, that the youth I discussed it with did not personally take it that seriously. In the future, I hope I can approach it another way that makes it a more beneficial experience."
- "I did have multiple conversations about this, and it didn't go as well as I had hoped. He said I was 'too old' to understand, and that he knew these things were 'jokes' and didn't take them seriously (e.g., memes and websites with hate speech), and that teachers at school talked about the same things, and I was 'boring' him, but I don't feel the message is clear to him or has sunk in."
- "I have not really discussed these topics with my children because I don't think they take it seriously. Everything is a joke to them and [they] blame people for being 'weak.'"

Some respondents indicated they did not feel comfortable speaking to children who were not their own, and that parents are better suited to have conversations surrounding extremism.

- "I would tell their parents instead of lecturing them myself."

- "I would be less comfortable doing so with other children unless I was in an 'in loco parentis' role."

A minority of participants expressed fears of retaliation or being targeted for their involvement in creating and/or joining groups.

- "I was not willing to discuss things because I did not want backlash from anyone on either side of the situation. I needed to protect myself first."
- "I don't like doing things like that. Creating groups that can pose a threat to myself or my family."

A small number of responses across the longitudinal study described the guide as liberal propaganda.

- "Because you're considering your view as the 'right' way, and you are attacking extremism as bad. But have you thought your view as anti-extremism is 'extreme' also? I want to see both views not just one."
- "I was not willing to. The child is now grown and off to college. I raised them right with proper values. I don't brainwash my kids with Democrat sponsored propaganda."
- "Because the information is very biased. People who are pro America are not the problem. You left wing loons and globalists are."

A minority of responses reflected views based on perceived gender differences.

- "I think most extremists are men, and men should take on tackling that. As a woman, I don't feel entirely comfortable doing that."
- "[After discussing why she doesn't need to speak to her granddaughter about extremism] ... this problem isn't as big with girls."

Participants shared positive experiences after joining groups.

- "So I joined this group on Reddit that shares all types of content and what to look out for and how to tell if something

is too good to be true, how to notice fake websites, how to detect when you're being groomed for something, stuff like that. I use this group a lot, and I used it when I was talking and sharing this with my family member, and I'm thankful for finding something like this because it's a treasure trove of golden information! The best action that I've seen done was my family member stopped listening to what they we're reading and following."

In Wave 3, those who did not find the guide useful cited not remembering the guide. However, those who found the guide useful could identify particularly interesting material.

- "I don't remember a lot about the guide because it was way back in November."
- "Information that social media is their main tool actually even with their other websites empowered me to speak up."

Appendix C: Quantitative Research Questions Answered

Awareness

1. How did awareness change over time?

Awareness significantly increased by 24% on average at baseline (Wave 1) from pre-guide to post-guide assessment. Awareness then significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months later (Wave 2) by 15.2% ($b = -2.87$, standard error [SE] = 0.17, $p < .001$) on average. Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3), awareness began to significantly increase through to 12 months (Wave 5) by 6.8% per wave on average ($b = 1.09$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < .001$). This calculation suggests that for each unit increase in time after the break (each wave after three months, i.e., Wave 2), there is an average increase of 6.8% in post-guide awareness from the mean value at three months (Wave 2). Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase in awareness of 20.4% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5). These changes in awareness occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, number of youth that participants take care of, general self-efficacy or parenting style. The adjusted ICC = .685, suggesting that 68.5% of the variability in parent/caregiver awareness of terminology related to youth radicalization and extremism over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth taken care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 31.5% of the variability in parent/caregiver awareness of youth radicalization and extremism-related terminology over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Researchers found that a greater post-guide awareness over time was significantly associated with:

- Female (compared to male) parents/caregivers.
- White (compared to Asian or Asian American and Black or African American) parents/caregivers.
- More highly educated parents/caregivers.
- Higher-income parents/caregivers.
- Democratic (compared to Republican) parents/caregivers.
- Taking care of a greater number of youths.
- Stronger sense of general self-efficacy.
- Stronger Authoritative parenting style (compared to Authoritarian).

2. Did awareness change differently for different caregiver populations?

No.

3. Does awareness change differently depending on how many minors one takes care of?

Not for the decrease in awareness from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months follow-up (Wave 2). But the subsequent increase in awareness from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) follow-up did depend on how many minors participants take care of. This was indicated by a statistically significant interaction between time and number of youth on awareness scores, $F(1, 2538) = 6.95$, $p = .008$. Specifically, awareness increased more from three to 12 months the more youth/minors the parents/caregivers reported caring for. This interaction remained significant after controlling for the same covariates as the main model. This suggests

that for parents/caregivers who take care of a higher number of youths, the increase in total awareness of radicalization terms is greater over time in the period after three months (Wave 2) compared to those who take care of fewer youths. In practical terms, this means that as time progresses from six months (Wave 3) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up, the impact of caring for more youths becomes increasingly significant on total awareness of radicalization words. This could imply that the demands or experiences associated with caring for a larger number of youths become more salient in influencing radicalization awareness over time.

4. Does awareness change differently depending on how old the minors are that one cares for?
No.

5. Does awareness change differently depending on how many hours of child care one uses?
No.


6. Does awareness change differently depending on how many hours one estimates that these minors spend online?
No.

Knowledge Accuracy

7. How did knowledge (overall average) change over time?

Overall knowledge accuracy significantly increased by 11% on average at baseline assessment (Wave 1) from pre-guide to post-guide assessment. Knowledge accuracy then significantly decreased from baseline (Wave

Figure 10. Awareness Change Over Time by Number Of Youths an Adult Takes Care Of



Note: Participants were divided into three groups based on the number of youth under age 18 they care for: Low (1 youth, $n = 688$), Moderate (2 youths, $n = 533$), and High (3-10 youths, $n = 335$). Lines represent mean trajectories across six time points: Wave 1 Pre-test (baseline), Wave 1 Post-test (immediately after reading guide), and Waves 2-5 (3, 6, 9, and 12 months post-reading the guide).

1 Post-Guide) to three months later (Wave 2) by 6.5% on average ($b = -0.06$, $SE = 0.004$, $p < .001$). Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3), post-follow-up, knowledge accuracy began to significantly increase through to 12 months (Wave 5) by about 1.0% per wave on average ($b = 0.01$, $SE = 0.001$, $p < .001$). Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase of 3% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) in knowledge accuracy. These changes in overall knowledge accuracy occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, residential geographic density (rural-urban), general self-efficacy, average daily number of hours youth reportedly spend online, average daily hours of child care per week and parenting style. The adjusted ICC = .687, suggesting that 68.7% of the variability in knowledge accuracy of youth radicalization over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 31.3% of the variability in knowledge accuracy of youth radicalization over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Researchers associated greater post-guide knowledge accuracy over time with:

- Male (compared to female) parents/caregivers.
- White (compared to Black or African American and Multiple 2+/Other) parents/caregivers.
- More highly educated parents/caregivers.
- Higher-income parents/caregivers.
- Democratic (compared to Republican) parents/caregivers.
- Living in a less dense (more rural) residential geographic environment.
- Having a weaker sense of general self-efficacy.

- Fewer reported average daily hours that their youth spend online.
- Stronger Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian) parenting style.

8. Did knowledge change differently for different caregiver populations?

No.

9. Did awareness change differently for different caregiver populations?

No.

10. Does knowledge change differently depending on how many minors one cares for?

Yes, for the initial decreasing slope from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months post-follow-up (Wave 2), knowledge accuracy was steeper for participants the more youth/minors they reported taking care of, $F(1, 1131) = 4.11$, $p = .043$. Specifically, for each additional youth reported, parents/caregivers had a less steep decline in knowledge accuracy from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) follow-up. This suggests that parents/caregivers of a higher number of youths exhibit a different trajectory in their knowledge accuracy in the initial phase after reading the guide compared to those who care for fewer youth. However, this interaction becomes nonsignificant after controlling for covariates ($F(1, 664) = 2.49$, $p = .115$), bringing into doubt the robustness of this finding. There was no significant interaction with the increasing slope from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up.

11. Does knowledge change differently depending on how old the minors are that one cares for?

No.

12. Does knowledge change differently depending on how many hours of child care one uses?

No.

13. Does knowledge change differently depending on how many hours one estimates that these minors spend online?

No.

Action-Behavior Intentions

RQ2: Behavior intention changes over time

14. How did behavioral intentions change over time?

Overall intentions to intervene with a youth/minor in matters related to radicalization and extremism significantly increased by 8% on average at baseline (Wave 1) from pre-guide to post-guide assessment. Behavior intentions then significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) post-follow-up by about 4.8% on average ($b = -0.14, SE = 0.03, p < .001$). This change remained significant after accounting for differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, political identity, general self-efficacy, role as a caretaker (e.g., taking care of own biological child, adopted child, extended family, multiple of these roles/other), worries about youth/minor psychological safety (overall averaged across environments), and parenting styles. There was no significant change in trajectory of action-behavioral intentions from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up after controlling for covariates ($b = 0.02, SE = 0.01, p = .058$). The adjusted ICC = .696, suggesting that 69.6% of the variability in reported behavioral intentions to intervene with youth radicalization over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 30.4% of the variability in reported behavioral intentions to intervene with youth radicalization over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Researchers found that greater post-guide behavioral intention to intervene with a youth/minor regarding radicalization and extremism over time was associated with:

- Older parents/caregivers (when only including basic demographic covariates).
- White (compared to Asian or Asian

American) parents/caregivers (when only including basic demographic covariates).

- Black or African American (compared to white) parents/caregivers (when only including basic demographic covariates).
- Multiple 2+/Other race/ethnicity (compared to white) parents/caregivers (when only including basic demographic covariates).
- Democratic (compared to Independent/other/none and Republican) parents/caregivers.
- Stronger sense of general self-efficacy.
- Having multiple parent/caregiver roles (compared to biological child only, when not controlling for worry about youth psychological safety).
- Having another parent/caregiver role (compared to biological child only).
- Older age of first youth/minor (when not controlling for worry about youth psychological safety).
- Greater worry about youths'/minors' psychological safety (averaged across home, school, state, online, sports, extracurriculars, friends and other contexts).
- Stronger Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.

15. Did behavioral intentions change differently for different caregiver populations?

No.

16. Do behavioral intentions change differently depending on how many minors one cares for?

No.

17. Do behavioral intentions change differently depending on how old the minors are that one takes care of?

No.

18. Do behavioral intentions change differently depending on how many hours of child care one uses?

No.

19. Do behavioral intentions change differently depending on how many hours one estimates that these minors spend online?

No.

20. What is the relationship between Awareness or Knowledge and (Cap)Ability?

Zero-order correlations: Across waves, greater reported capability was significantly associated with greater awareness (Pearson $r = .30$, 95% CI [.28, .33], $p < .001$) and greater knowledge accuracy (Pearson $r = .24$, 95% CI [.22, .27], $p < .001$).


Piecewise mixed effects model: Controlling for parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, residential geographic area density (rural-urban), general self-efficacy, role as a

caregiver, age of first youth/minor reported and parenting style, a one-unit increase in total awareness sum is significantly associated with a 0.02-unit increase ($b = 0.02$, $SE = 0.003$, $p < .001$) in capability. This translates to mean that a 10% increase in parent/caregiver awareness of radicalization and extremism phrases is associated with a 1.2% increase in capability to intervene with youth radicalization.

A 10% improvement in knowledge accuracy of youth radicalization and extremism (e.g., getting an additional 10% of the questions correct, or improving from getting 70% of the questions correct to 80%) is associated with a 1.6% increase in the measured capability to intervene with youth radicalization ($b = 0.61$, $SE = 0.10$, $p < .001$).

The adjusted ICC = .551, suggesting that 55.1% of the variability in reported capability to intervene with youth radicalization over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number

Figure 11. Confidence to Intervene in Youth Radicalization and Extremism Over Time



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the *P&C Guide*. Higher scores indicate more confidence to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.), and that 44.9% of the variability in reported capability to intervene with youth radicalization over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.


Confidence

21. How did confidence change over time?

Confidence significantly increased by 10% at baseline (Wave 1) from pre-guide to post-guide assessment. Confidence then significantly decreased from three months (Wave 1) to six months (Wave 2) post-guide by 3.8% on average ($b = -0.12$, $SE = 0.02$, $p < .001$). Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3) post-follow-up, confidence

began to significantly increase through to 12 months (Wave 5) by about 0.6% per wave on average ($b = 0.02$, $SE = 0.01$, $p = .010$). Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase of 1.8% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) in confidence. These changes in overall confidence occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, political identity, general self-efficacy, age of first youth/minor reported and parenting style. The adjusted ICC = .615, suggesting that 61.5% of the variability in confidence to intervene in youth radicalization over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 38.5% of the variability in confidence to intervene in youth radicalization over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Figure 12. Confidence Over Time by Number of Youths an Adult Takes Care Of



Note: Participants were divided into three groups based on the number of youth under age 18 they care for: Low (1 youth, $n = 688$), Moderate (2 youths, $n = 533$), and High (3-10 youths, $n = 335$). Lines represent mean trajectories across six time points: Wave 1 Pre-test (baseline), Wave 1 Post-test (immediately after reading guide), and Waves 2-5 (3, 6, 9, and 12 months post-reading the guide).

Researchers found that a greater post-guide confidence to address youth radicalization was significantly associated over time with:

- Older parents/caregivers, controlling for basic demographics only.
- White (compared to Asian or Asian American) parents/caregivers, controlling for basic demographics only.
- More highly educated parents/caregivers.
- Democratic (compared to Republican) parents/caregivers.
- Role as caregiver for biological child (compared to family), controlling for basic demographics only (becomes nonsignificant after adding self-efficacy to the model).
- Stronger sense of general self-efficacy.
- Having an older first child/youth age reported, controlling for basic demographics only.
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.

22. Did confidence change differently for different caregiver populations?

No.

23. Did confidence change differently depending on how many minors one cares for?

Not for the first slope from baseline (Wave 1) to three months post-follow-up (Wave 2). But the significant increase in confidence from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) depended on the number of youths/minors participants care for. On average, the larger the amount of young people that participants care for the more confident they became from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5). Researchers recognized this indication via a statistically significant interaction between the time variable and the number of youths taken care of and cared for variable on awareness scores, $F(1, 670) = 7.91, p = .005$. Specifically, confidence increased more from

three to 12 months the more youth/minors the parents/caregivers reported taking care of. This interaction remained significant after controlling for the same covariates as the main model. This suggests that for parents/caregivers with a higher number of youths, the increase in confidence to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism is greater over time in the period after three months (Wave 2) compared to those who take care of fewer youths. In practical terms, this means that as time progresses from six months (Wave 3) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up, the impact of having more youths becomes increasingly significant on confidence. This could imply that the demands or experiences associated with caring for a larger number of minors become more salient in influencing confidence to intervene in youth radicalization over time.

24. Did confidence change differently depending on how old the minors are that one cares for?

No.

25. Did confidence change differently depending on how many hours of child care one uses?

No.

26. Did confidence change differently depending on how many hours one estimates that these minors spend online?


No.

27. What is the relationship between awareness or knowledge and confidence?

Zero-order correlations: Across waves, greater reported capability was significantly associated with greater awareness (Pearson $r = .29, 95\% \text{ CI} [.26, .31], p < .001$) and greater knowledge accuracy (Pearson $r = .24, 95\% \text{ CI} [.21, .26], p < .001$).

Piecewise mixed effects model: Controlling for parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, political identity, general self-efficacy, age of first child/youth reported and parenting style, a one-unit increase in total awareness sum is significantly associated with a 0.02-unit increase in confidence ($b = 0.02, SE = 0.003, p < .001$).

Figure 13. Willingness to Intervene in Youth Radicalization and Extremism Over Time



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the guide. Higher scores indicate more willingness to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

This translates to mean that a 10% increase in parent/caregiver awareness about youth radicalization and extremism phrases is associated with a 1.2% increase in confidence to intervene in youth radicalization. A one-unit (or 100 percentage points) increase in knowledge accuracy about youth radicalization is associated with an increase of 0.65 units in confidence. In other words, a 10% improvement in knowledge accuracy about radicalization is associated with approximately a 1.6% increase in confidence to intervene in youth radicalization.

The adjusted ICC = .538, suggesting that 53.8% of the variability in confidence to intervene with youth radicalization over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 46.2% of the variability in confidence to intervene in youth radicalization over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

28. Are men in our sample higher in confidence than women?
No.

29. Does self-efficacy moderate the relationship between aggregate confidence and aggregate willingness to engage?

This question specifically asks whether there is an interaction between self-efficacy and willingness on confidence. Though both greater self-efficacy and greater willingness have independent effects on greater confidence, there was no interaction between efficacy and willingness, suggesting that their effects on confidence did not depend on each other.

However, change in confidence over time depended on general self-efficacy: The initial decline in confidence from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) post-follow-up depended on general self-efficacy, $F(1, 1173) = 4.98, p = .026$, suggesting that individuals with higher self-efficacy at three months (Wave 2) tended to show a less pronounced decrease in confidence over time leading up to Wave 2, compared to those with lower self-efficacy. However, this interaction became non-significant after adding the other covariates to the model, $F(1, 665) = 2.68, p = .102$, calling into question the robustness of this finding. The increasing slope from three

months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-guide did not depend on self-efficacy.

Willingness


30. How did willingness to engage change over time?

Overall willingness to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism significantly increased by 5% at baseline (Wave 1) from pre-guide to post-guide assessment. Willingness to engage then significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post Guide) to three months (Wave 2) follow-up by 1.9% on average, $b = -0.06$, $SE = 0.03$, $p = .031$. These changes in awareness occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education,

income, political identity, general self-efficacy, role of a caregiver, age of first youth/minor reported and parenting style. Between three months (Wave 2) and 12 months (Wave 5) the trajectory for willingness did not change (remained stable/flat). The adjusted ICC = .533, suggesting that 53.3% of the variability in willingness to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 46.7% of the variability in willingness to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Participants who reported being significantly more willing to engage with youth about radicalization tended to be:

Figure 14. Willingness Over Time by Number Of Youths an Adult Takes Care Of



Note: Participants were divided into three groups based on the number of youth under age 18 they care for: Low (1 youth, $n = 688$), Moderate (2 youths, $n = 533$), and High (3-10 youths, $n = 335$). Lines represent mean trajectories across six time points: Wave 1 Pre-test (baseline), Wave 1 Post-test (immediately after reading guide), and Waves 2-5 (3, 6, 9, and 12 months post-reading the guide).

- Older participants, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Male (compared to Female) participants, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- White (compared to Asian or Asian American) participants, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Married participants reported more willingness to intervene than those who identified as Other/Separated/Widowed/Divorced, but this was only without covariates in the model.
- Less educated.
- Higher income, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Democrat (compared to Republican) participants.
- Higher in general self-efficacy.
- Parents who care for their own biological child (compared to caring for family), when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Parents/caregivers who have multiple caregiver roles (more than one, compared to only biological child or children), when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Parents/caregivers of older youth/minors, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.

31. Did willingness to engage change differently for different caregiver populations?

No.

32. Does willingness to engage change differently depending on how many minors one cares for?

Yes, the initial significant decrease in willingness to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) post-follow-up depended on how many young people participants take care of, $F(1, 1318) = 7.93, p = .005$. Specifically, as the total number of youth participants care for increases, the rate of change in willingness also increases. However, this interaction became non-significant after adding covariates to the model $F(1, 665) = 0.10, p = .757$, calling into question the robustness of this finding.

Researchers also found that the association between the number of children participants take care of and willingness to engage changed over time. Participants who take care of a greater number of youths had a significantly greater increase in willingness to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up, $F(1, 2642), = 5.54, p = .019$, accounting for the same covariates in the main model. In practical terms, this means that as time progresses from six months (Wave 3) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up, the impact of caring for more youths becomes increasingly significant on willingness to engage with youth about radicalization. This could imply that the demands or experiences associated with caring for a larger number of youths become more salient in influencing willingness to intervene in youth radicalization over time.

33. Does willingness to engage change differently depending on the age of the minors one cares for?


No.

34. Does willingness to engage change differently depending on how many hours of childcare one uses?

No.

35. Does willingness to engage change differently depending on how many hours

Figure 15. Usefulness of Guide for Participants



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the *P&C Guide*. Higher scores indicate more finding the guide more useful. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

one estimates that these minors spend online?

No.

36. What is the relationship between awareness or knowledge and willingness to engage?

Zero-order correlations: Across waves, greater reported capability was significantly associated with greater awareness (Pearson $r = .24$, 95% CI [.22, .27], $p < .001$) and greater knowledge accuracy (Pearson $r = .26$, 95% CI [.23, .28], $p < .001$).

Piecewise mixed effects model: Controlling for parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, general self-efficacy, role as a caretaker, age of first child/youth reported and parenting style, a one unit increase in awareness was significantly associated with a 0.02 unit ($b = 0.02$, $SE = 0.003$, $p < .001$) increase in willingness to engage. In terms of percent impact, a 10.0% increase in parent/guardian awareness about youth radicalization and extremism phrases is associated with approximately a 1.1% increase in willingness to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism.

A one-unit increase in knowledge accuracy (which means moving from 0% to 100% correct) about youth radicalization was associated with a 0.94 unit ($b = 0.94$, $SE = 0.12$, $p < .001$) increase in willingness to engage. In terms of impact, this means a 10% improvement in knowledge accuracy about youth radicalization is associated with approximately a 2.4% increase in willingness to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism.

The adjusted ICC = .487, suggesting that 48.7% of the variability in willingness to intervene in youth radicalization over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 51.27% of the variability in willingness to intervene in youth radicalization over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

37. Does self-efficacy moderate the relationship between aggregate ability and aggregate willingness to engage?

No.

Practical Application Questions

Usefulness

38. How did usefulness change over time?

Guide usefulness ratings did not significantly change from three-month (Wave 2) to six-month (Wave 3) follow-up ($b = 0.07$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = .200$), after controlling for covariates. Between six months (Wave 3) and nine months (Wave 4) post-follow-up, guide usefulness ratings decreased significantly by about 10.4% on average ($b = -0.24$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < .001$). Between nine months (Wave 4) and 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up, guide usefulness ratings increased significantly by about 5.0% on average ($b = 0.10$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = .038$). These changes in guide satisfaction ratings occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, employment status, political identity, general self-efficacy, reported average daily youth online hours, reported average daily hours of childcare use per week, worries about youth psychological safety and parenting style. The adjusted ICC = .664, suggesting that 66.4% of the variability in guide usefulness ratings over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 33.6% of the variability in guide usefulness ratings over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Researchers found that higher ratings of the guide's usefulness were significantly associated over time with:


- Older parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.
- Asian or Asian American (compared to white) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.

- Black or African American (compared to white) parents/caregivers.
- Hispanic or Latinx (compared to white) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.
- Multiple 2+/Other race/ethnicity (compared to white) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.
- Lower-income parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.
- Not working (compared to working) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.
- Democrat (compared to Republican) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.
- Democrat (compared to Independent/other/none), only in the full model not when controlling for only basic demographics.
- Stronger general self-efficacy.
- More reported average daily hours youth spend online, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.
- More reported average daily hours of childcare per week, when controlling for basic demographics only, not in the full model.
- Parents/caregivers who worry more about their youth's psychological safety (averaged across environments/contexts).
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parents/caregivers.

39. Did usefulness change differently for different caregiver populations?

No.

Figure 16. When Parents and Caregivers Joined/Created Groups



Note: At Wave 5, researchers asked participants who indicated they had created or joined a group that discusses issues of youth radicalization and extremism when they did so. $n = 117$.

40. What is the relationship between awareness or knowledge and usefulness?

Without controlling for covariates, greater awareness is significantly associated with higher guide-satisfaction ratings. However, after adding the covariates from the main model above, neither awareness nor knowledge are significantly associated with guide usefulness ratings.

41. Overall, which group of young people did our sample share or apply the information from the guide with the most?


Over the course of our study, our sample of parents and caregivers shared or applied the information from the guide most with their own biological children ($n = 627$; 40.1%), followed by multiple categories of youth ($n = 377$; 24.2%), and family members ($n = 178$; 11.4%). Note these are unique counts, so if a participant indicated they shared guide information with, for example, their own biological child once at any of the five waves, that instance was only counted once in the total.

In counting totals across waves, where participants can report sharing the guide information with the same given youth category at each wave, participants reported sharing guide information with their biological children $n = 1,249$ times, with multiple 2+ categories of youth $n = 702$ times, and with family $n = 268$ times.

42. Overall, what ways did our sample most often use the information from the guide?


Over the course of our study, our sample of parent and caregiver participants most often used and applied the guide in multiple 2+ ways ($n = 747$; 46.3%). This was followed by “thought more deeply about the information in the guide” ($n = 660$; 40.9%), sharing the information with adult family/friends ($n = 93$; 5.8%), and sharing the information with family/friends under the age of 18 ($n = 84$; 5.2%). A total of $n = 303$ (18.8%) reported using the guide information to prevent youth from being recruited into extremism at least once throughout the study, $n = 180$ (59.4%) reported using the guide to prevent youth radicalization once, $n = 85$ (28.1%) twice, $n =$

Figure 17. Understanding the Youth Radicalization Process



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the guide. Higher scores indicate greater understanding of the process of youth radicalization. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 18. Feeling Prepared to Talk About Online Extremism



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the P&C Guide. Higher scores indicate greater feelings of preparedness to talk to youth about radicalization and extremism. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

32 (10.6%) three times, and $n = 6$ (2.0%) four times. Note these are unique counts, so if a participant indicated they used the guide in more than one way they were counted in the “multiple 2+ ways” category.

43. Overall, what did our sample find most useful about the guide?

Over the course of our study, our sample of parent and caregiver participants found multiple 2+ aspects of the guide useful ($n = 1,010$; 64.9%); followed by the list of websites, platforms, and apps to watch out for ($n = 142$; 9.1%); how to have conversations about extremism with youth ($n = 133$; 8.5%); and the strategies that extremists use to recruit young people ($n = 113$; 6.0%). A total of $n = 131$ (8.4%) did not find the guide useful, and $n = 205$ (13.2%) could not remember. Note these are unique counts, so if a participant indicated they used the guide, for example, to prevent youth radicalization into extremism once at any of the five waves, that instance was only counted once in the total.

In counting totals across waves, where participants can report what they found useful about the guide with the same use category at each wave, participants found multiple 2+ aspects of the guide useful ($n = 2,058$ times), followed by the list of websites, platforms, and apps to watch out for ($n = 160$ times), how to have conversations about extremism with youth ($n = 138$ times), and the strategies that extremists use to recruit young people ($n = 125$ times). A total of $n = 200$ times participants reported they did not find the guide useful, and $n = 269$ times they could not remember.

44. Overall, how many people joined or created a group that discusses issues of youth radicalization and extremism? Did that change over time?

By 12 months (Wave 5) follow-up, $n = 117$, or 16.2% of Wave 5 parents and caregivers who continued to participate in the study reported having joined or created a group that discusses issues of youth radicalization and extremism. Researchers recorded slight upticks in parents and caregivers joining and creating such groups over summer and

early fall months, perhaps due to having more time in general or spending more time with their youth. It is important to note that this increase in percentage could be because participants who are more likely to stay engaged with the study were also more likely to become involved in a group over time. Across all five waves, regardless of study dropout, $n = 217$ (13.4% of Wave 1 sample) reported joining or creating a group that discusses issues of youth radicalization and extremism (Wave 2 $n = 140$, Wave 3 $n = 110$, Wave 4 $n = 94$)

Post-Test Wrap-up Questions


45. Did any of these five items change significantly over time?

1. “Do you understand the process by which youth become radicalized online?”

Understanding the process of youth radicalization significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) follow-up by 4.2% on average ($b = -0.13$, $SE = 0.03$, $p < .001$). Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3) post-follow-up, understanding the process of youth radicalization began to significantly increase through to 12 months (Wave 5) by about 2.1% per wave on average ($b = 0.06$, $SE = 0.01$, $p < .001$).

Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase of 6.4% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) in understanding the process of youth radicalization. These changes in understanding the youth radicalization process occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, general self-efficacy, roles as a parent/caregiver and parenting style. The adjusted ICC = .514, suggesting that 51.4% of the variability in understanding the process of youth radicalization over time can be

Figure 19. Feeling Prepared to Intervene in Youth Radicalization and Extremism Over Time



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the guide. Higher scores indicate greater capacity/capability to intervene with youth suspected to be in contact with extremist values. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 48.6% of the variability in understanding the process of youth radicalization over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error, and other unexplained sources of variability.

Researchers found that a greater understanding of the youth radicalization process was significantly associated over time with:

- White (compared to Asian or Asian American) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Democrat (compared to Republican) parents/caregivers.
- Stronger general self-efficacy.
- Having multiple caregiver roles (compared to only one biological child).
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.


2. “Do you feel prepared to talk with youth about online extremism?”

Feeling prepared to talk to youth about radicalization and extremism significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) follow-up by 6.3% on average ($b = -0.19, SE = 0.03, p < .001$). Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3) post-follow-up, feeling prepared to talk to youth about radicalization and extremism began to significantly increase through to 12 months (Wave 5) by about 1.4% per wave on average ($b = 0.04, SE = 0.01, p < .001$).

Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase of 4.3% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) in feeling prepared to talk to youth about radicalization and extremism. These changes in feeling prepared to talk to youth about radicalization and extremism occurred over time regardless of differences in parents’/caregivers’ age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, general self-efficacy, roles as a parent/caregiver, age of first youth/minor reported and parenting style.

The adjusted ICC = .533, suggesting that 53.3%

Figure 20. Knowing Where to Find Resources to Help Prevent Youth Radicalization



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the *P&C Guide*. Higher scores indicate greater knowledge about where to find help about youth suspected of encountering extremist ideas. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

of the variability in feeling prepared to talk to youth about radicalization and extremism over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 46.7% of the variability in feeling prepared to talk to youth about radicalization and extremism over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Researchers found that feeling more prepared to talk to youth about radicalization and extremism was significantly associated over time with:

- Older parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Female (compared to Male) parents/caregivers, only in the full model, not without covariates.
- White (compared to Asian or Asian American) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.

- Less educated parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Higher-income parents/givers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Democrat (compared to Republican) parents/caregivers, only in the full model, not without covariates.
- Stronger general self-efficacy.
- Having multiple caregiver roles (compared to only one biological child), when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Older age of first youth/minor reported.
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.

3. “Could you intervene with youth that you suspect are in contact with extremist values?”

The extent to which participants could intervene with youth they suspect of being

in contact with radicalizing and extremist values significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) follow-up by 6.2% on average ($b = -0.19$, $SE = 0.3$, $p < .001$). Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3) post-follow-up, ability to intervene with youth radicalization and extremism began to significantly increase through to 12 months (Wave 5) by about 1.2% per wave on average ($b = 0.03$, $SE = 0.01$, $p = .002$).


Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase of 3.6% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) in ability to intervene with youth radicalization and extremism. These changes in ability to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, general self-efficacy, roles as a parent/caregiver, age of first youth/minor reported, reported average daily hours youth spend online and parenting style.

The adjusted ICC = .508, suggesting that 50.8% of the variability in ability to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 49.2% of the variability in ability to intervene in youth radicalization and extremism over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Researchers found that a greater ability to intervene with youth radicalization and extremism was significantly associated over time with:

- Older parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Female (compared to Male) parents/caregivers, only in the full model, not without covariates.

Figure 21. Ability to Use and Apply the Guide




Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the guide. Higher scores indicate greater capacity/capability to use and apply the resources provided by the guide. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

- White (compared to Asian or Asian American) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Less educated parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Higher-income parents/givers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Stronger general self-efficacy.
- Having multiple caregiver roles (compared to only one biological child).
- Taking care of own biological child (compared to taking care of family), when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Reporting youth spending more time online on average per day, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Older age of first youth/minor reported.
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.

4. “Do you know where to get help if you suspect a child or children you know are coming into contact with extremist ideas?”

The extent to which participants know where to get help for youth they suspect of being in contact with radicalizing and extremist values significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) follow-up by 7.6% on average ($b = -0.24$, $SE = 0.03$, $p < .001$). Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3) post-follow-up, knowing where to get help with youth radicalization and extremism began to significantly increase through to 12 months

Figure 22. Satisfaction With the Guide Over Time



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the P&C Guide. Higher scores indicate higher satisfaction with the guide. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

(Wave 5) by about 2.3% per wave on average ($b = 0.07$, $SE = 0.01$, $p < .001$).

Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase of 6.9% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) in knowing where to get help with radicalization and extremism. These changes in knowing where to get help with youth radicalization and extremism occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, political identity, income, general self-efficacy, roles as a parent/caregiver, age of first youth/minor reported and parenting style.

The adjusted ICC = .544, suggesting that 54.4% of the variability in knowing where to get help with youth radicalization and extremism over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 45.6% of the variability in knowing where to get help with youth radicalization and extremism over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Research found that greater knowledge of where to get help with youth radicalization and extremism was significantly associated over time with:

- Older parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Female (compared to Male) parents/caregivers, only in the full model, not without covariates.
- White (compared to Asian or Asian American) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Less educated parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Higher-income parents/givers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Democrat (compared to Republican) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Stronger general self-efficacy.
- Having multiple caregiver roles (compared to only one biological child).
- Older age of first youth/minor reported.
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.


5. “Could you use and apply the resources provided in the guide?”

The extent to which participants use and apply resources in the guide significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months (Wave 2) follow-up by 12.4% on average ($b = -0.40$, $SE = 0.03$, $p < .001$). Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3) post-follow-up, ability to use and apply resources in the guide began to significantly increase through to 12 months (Wave 5) by about 1.9% per wave on average ($b = 0.05$, $SE = 0.01$, $p < .001$).

Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase of 5.8% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) in ability to use and apply resources in the guide. These changes in ability to use and apply resources in the guide occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, income, general self-efficacy, age of first youth/minor reported and parenting style.

The adjusted ICC = .478, suggesting that 47.8% of the variability in ability to use and apply resources in the guide over time can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 52.2% of the variability in ability to use and apply resources in the guide over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Figure 23. Daily Hours Spent Online by Youth When Caregivers' Care as Reported by Caregivers



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the guide. Higher scores indicate more reported average daily hours youth spend online when in parents'/caregivers' care. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

Researchers found that a greater ability to use and apply resources in the guide was significantly associated over time with:

- Older parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- White (compared to Asian or Asian American) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Democrat (compared to Republican) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Stronger general self-efficacy.
- Older age of first youth/minor reported.
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.

46. What were the strongest predictors for these five items-as-outcome-variables?

- Having multiple caregiver roles (compared to only one biological child).

- Taking care of older youth.
- Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.
- Significant predictors depending on covariates in the model (i.e., might not be robust):
 - Older parents/caregivers.
 - Female compared to male parents/caregivers.
 - White compared to Asian or Asian American parents/caregivers.
 - Democrat compared to Republican parents/caregivers.
 - Less educated parents/caregivers.

47. Did satisfaction change over time?

Guide satisfaction significantly decreased from baseline (Wave 1 Post-Guide) to three months later (Wave 2) by 9.5% ($b = -2.86, SE = 0.05, p < .001$) on average. Between three months (Wave 2) and six months (Wave 3)

post-follow-up, guide satisfaction began to significantly increase through to 12 months (Wave 5) by 3.6% per wave on average ($b = 0.10$, $SE = 0.01$, $p < .001$). This calculation suggests that for each unit increase in time after the break (i.e., each wave after Wave 2 (i.e., three months after seeing the guide for the first time), there is an average increase of 3.6% in post-guide satisfaction from the mean value at three months (Wave 2).

Assuming this change is linear, this suggests a total increase of 10.8% from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) in awareness. These changes in guide satisfaction occurred over time regardless of differences in parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, psychological safety and parenting style.


The adjusted ICC = .690, suggesting that 69.0% of the variability in parent/caregiver satisfaction with the guide over time can be

explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 31.0% of the variability in parent/caregiver satisfaction with the guide over time can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Researchers found that greater guide satisfaction over time was significantly associated with:

- Older parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Male (compared to Female) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Male (compared to other sex) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.

Figure 24. Daily Hours Spent Online by Youth When Not Under Caregivers' Care as Reported by Caregivers



Note: The vertical dashed black line = when participants read the guide. Higher scores indicate more reported average daily hours youth spend online when in parents'/caregivers' care. Shaded area band around the trend line = 95% confidence intervals.

- Democrat (compared to Independent/other/none and Republican) parents and caregivers.
- Greater worry about youth's psychological safety (averaged across environmental contexts), when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Stronger Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.

48. Did satisfaction change differently for different caregiver populations?

No.

49. Which was satisfaction most strongly related to: aggregate awareness, knowledge, capacity, capability, confidence or willingness to engage?

The estimates were not standardized, so we cannot directly compare these. Nonetheless, including them all in the same model with the same covariates as the main guide satisfaction model above, we find that:

- Awareness was not significantly associated with guide satisfaction ($b = -0.0001$, $SE = 0.04$, $p = .975$).
- Greater knowledge accuracy was significantly associated with greater guide satisfaction (or vice versa, more satisfied = did better with knowledge accuracy; $b = 0.74$, $SE = 0.18$, $p < .001$).

Since capacity, capability, confidence and willingness were measured on the same scale, we can compare those.

- Capacity was the strongest predictor of guide satisfaction ($b = 0.22$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < .001$), followed closely behind by willingness ($b = 0.20$, $SE = 0.03$, $p < .001$).
- Capability was not associated with guide satisfaction ($b = -0.002$, $SE = 0.04$, $p = .957$).
- Greater confidence was significantly associated with greater guide satisfaction ($b = 0.11$, $SE = 0.04$, $p = .005$).

50. What subpopulation of parents/caregivers does this appeal to most?

- Older parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Democrats (compared to Independent/other/none and Republican) parents and caregivers.
- Those with greater worry about youth's psychological safety (averaged across environmental contexts), when controlling for basic demographics only, not the full model.
- Stronger Authoritative (compared to Authoritarian and Permissive) parenting style.

Reported Average Daily Youth Online Hours

51. Did exposure to the resource change how many hours per day minors spent online in care and not in care?

We would need an experiment with random assignment to attribute causal change in minors' online time to parental exposure to the guide.

When in a Participant's Care

There was no significant change in youth online hours in parent's/caregiver's care from baseline (Wave 1) to three months (Wave 2) post-follow-up ($b = 0.08$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .137$). There was, however, a significant decrease in reported average daily number of hours of youth/minors spend online in their parent's/caregiver's care from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up ($b = -0.06$, $SE = 0.02$, $p = .013$).

This decrease *could* be due to reading the guide or simply from participating in this study raising awareness about youth online extremism. Something also could have

happened during this time (e.g., a historical effect), or something else could be driving it. Nonetheless, this decrease in reported youth online hours on average per day when in parents'/caregivers' care remained significant after controlling for basic demographics, but not after controlling for all covariates.

The adjusted ICC = .514, suggesting that 51.4% of the variability in reported average daily youth online hours over time when in a participant's care can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 48.6% of the variability in reported average daily youth online hours over time when in participants' care can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Parents/caregivers who reported that their youth spend more time online in their care over time also tended to be:

- Older parents/caregivers.
- Male (compared to Female) parents/caregivers.
- Black or African American (compared to white) parents/caregivers.
- White (compared to Asian or Asian American), when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Hispanic or Latinx (compared to white) parents/caregivers.
- Multiple 2+/other race/ethnicity (compared to white), in the full model but not with reduced covariates.
- Less educated.
- Marital status is Other/Separated/Widowed/Divorced (compared to Married) parents/caregivers.
- Republican (compared to Democrat)

parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.

- Caregivers who care for family youth (compared to a biological child or children).
- Greater worry about youth's/minor's psychological safety overall, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Permissive (compared to Authoritarian) parenting style.

When Not in Participants' Care

There was a significant increase in parent/caregiver reported youth online hours while *not* in parent's/caregiver's care from baseline (Wave 1) to three months (Wave 2) post-follow-up, $b = 0.16$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .011$. There was no statistically significant change in reported average daily number of hours that youth/minors spend online when not in their parent's/caregiver's care from three months (Wave 2) to 12 months (Wave 5) post-follow-up. The adjusted ICC = .479, suggesting that 47.9% of the variability in reported average daily youth online hours over time when *not* in participants' care can be explained by between-person differences (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, number of youth take care of, parenting style, etc.) and that 52.1% of the variability in reported average daily youth online hours over time when *not* in participants' care can be attributed to within-person change, measurement error and other unexplained sources of variability.

Parents/caregivers who reported that their youth spend more time online *not* in their care over time also tended to be:

- Older parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Identify sex as Other (compared to Male) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.

- Asian or Asian American (compared to white) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Black or African American (compared to white) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Hispanic or Latinx (compared to white) parents/caregivers.
- Multiple 2+/other race/ethnicity (compared to white) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Less educated, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Lower income, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Not working (compared to Working) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Marital status as Other/Separated/Widowed/Divorced (compared to Married) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Republican (compared to Democrat) parents/caregivers, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Living in a denser (more urban) residential geographic area, when controlling for basic demographic covariates only, not the full model.
- Role as a caregiver taking care of family (compared to biological child).
- Having multiple caregiver roles (compared to biological child).
- Role as a caregiver taking care of other (compared to biological child).
- Take care of older youths/minors.
- More worried about their youths' psychological safety (overall across environments/contexts).
- Authoritarian (compared to Authoritative) parenting style.
- Permissive (compared to Authoritative) parenting style.

Supplementary Data Visualizations

Figure 25. Awareness of Guide Terms by Parenting Style Over Time




Figure 26. Guide Usefulness by Political Identity Over Time




Figure 27. Guide Usefulness by Parenting Style Over Time





Figure 28: Average Concern for Youth Psychological Safety in Environments by Parenting Style


0=Not at all concerned, 1=A little concerned, 2=Somewhat concerned, 3=Quite a bit concerned, 4=A great deal concerned

■ Permissive ■ Authoritative ■ Authoritarian


When online




At extracurriculars




At school




At sports




With friends



At home



In the state



Appendix D: References

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Endnotes

1 "Frequently asked questions about hate and antigovernment groups," Southern Poverty Law Center, <https://www.splcenter.org/resources/reports/frequently-asked-questions-about-hate-and-antigovernment-groups/>.

2 These changes in awareness occurred over time regardless of individual differences in Parents'/caregivers' age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, income, political identity, number of youth participants taken care of, general self-efficacy or parenting style (see Figure 3).

Acknowledgements

America University's Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (PERIL) produced this report in collaboration with the Southern Poverty Law Center's Intelligence Project.

Designed by the SPLC.