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# POLICY PERSPECTIVE: PREVENTING DOMESTIC TERRORISM ACT

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Research & Innovation Lab (PERIL)

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## Background & Research

**Domestic terrorism is amongst one of the most serious threats facing our country today.** In October 2020, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under President Trump issued a threat assessment report declaring general domestic violent extremism and white supremacist extremists in particular, are the “most persistent and lethal threat in the homeland.”<sup>1</sup> The Biden administration issued a similar assessment in spring 2021<sup>2</sup> prompting the first-ever national strategy to counter domestic terrorism. This strategy highlighted the rising threat posed by white supremacist extremism as well as anti-government and unlawful militias to civilians, elected officials, and democratic institutions.<sup>3</sup> Disinformation, propaganda, and conspiracy theories play essential roles in both the motivation and outcomes of these threats. According to the Global Terrorism Database, terrorist attacks motivated by conspiracy theorists were responsible for 119 attacks in 2020<sup>4</sup>—a jump from 6 attacks the year before—in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and Germany. Similarly, we see a clear causal link between polarization and violent extremism. **In 2024, the Council on Foreign Relations categorized political polarization at the highest level of priority for worldwide conflicts**<sup>5, 6</sup> In sum, the U.S. and our allies have seen rising hate, violent extremism, and political violence fueled by propaganda, disinformation, conspiracy theories, and polarization and in a pattern of violence that has been escalating for years.

**Violence is a clear repercussion of such widespread circulation of propaganda, conspiracy theories, and disinformation.** Between 2013 and 2021, the number of open domestic terrorism-related cases in the U.S. jumped **357% to 9,049 cases**, with the most violent incidents being committed by racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists during the same years<sup>7</sup>. **Of the 444 people killed by extremists** in the U.S. between 2013 and 2022, the significant majority of deaths were at the hands of far-right extremists (335 deaths, or 75%)<sup>8</sup>. Of those far-right extremists who committed murder in 2021, 73% were affiliated with white supremacy, 5% with incel and misogynist ideology, and 17% with anti-government extremism<sup>2</sup>. Two widely known tragedies—the 2018 shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh and a 2022 shooting that killed 10 people in a grocery store in a predominantly Black neighborhood in Buffalo, NY—were both largely motivated by the so-called “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, a false and malicious claim that shadowy forces are conspiring to eliminate whites in the United States and abroad.<sup>10</sup>



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**Strategies solely focused on arresting individuals after they commit crimes have remained the standard for countering this crisis.** Following the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Department of Homeland Security was created, <sup>11</sup> and since then, DHS has served as the primary hub for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). <sup>12</sup> Following 9/11, prevention efforts were limited, focusing on policies such as travel and immigration restrictions. Policies such as these put Muslims and Arabs in their crosshairs, which led to two troubling outcomes: turning entire ethnicities into targets of suspicion, and, ignoring the expansion of domestic terrorism. In 2011, the Obama Administration launched its [CVE Initiative](#), which was later described in a report sponsored by the Department of Justice as, "poorly structured and under-resourced." <sup>13</sup> With community outreach work embedded within the FBI, the effort suffered throughout from a lack of credibility or trust. In keeping with previous federal CVE work, the Obama CVE Initiative, "suffered from its virtually exclusive focus on engagement with Muslim-American communities," and "bolstered the false stereotype that Muslim Americans were more susceptible to violent extremism than other Americans." As it came into office, the Trump Administration shut down this CVE Initiative, cut off all funding of prevention programming for two years, and moved away from CVE terminology. <sup>14</sup> Ultimately, the DHS under Trump did restore \$10 Million of funding for prevention through DHS, this amount paled in comparison to enforcement and incarceration efforts. Furthermore, even when these P/CVE efforts successfully arrested, tried, and incarcerated individuals, the carceral system into which these people were placed did not provide off-ramps to deradicalize them; in fact, prisons are places of profound radicalization. <sup>15</sup> For 20 years, and through three consecutive administrations, **the focus of federal P/CVE efforts on thwarting extremist attempts did not reduce the spread of violent extremism. Instead, this violence only grew.** <sup>16</sup>

There is every reason to arrest, to try, and to incarcerate those who commit or plan violence based on their extremist views. **The security sector is an essential *post hoc* response to hate crimes and terrorist events. However, the decades since the Oklahoma City bombing have demonstrated that securitized solutions to extremism are not sufficient:** the number and impact of these horrific events only grows year to year. *Securitized solutions, on their own, react to the manifestations of hate: they do not prevent the spread of hate.*

A growing body of evidence shows us effective ways to intervene in pathways to violent extremism and domestic terrorism. **These approaches equip the public with tools that shore up their capacity and resilience.** Importantly, these approaches protect the right to free speech and reduce the need for security-based responses. These methods, many of which have been pioneered overseas and are now being brought to the States, focus on community-based programs that can be broadened, coordinated, and sustained by State and Federal commitments to collaboration and funding. **These methods focus on primary methods of**



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**intervention, with the goal of building resilience against polarization, radicalization, and their correlations on the individual, communal, state, and federal levels. The best of these approaches can be brought under the umbrella of a “public health” strategy to address these issues.**

Research demonstrates the value of **primary prevention efforts in countering extremism**. Primary interventions are “broad-based, mass prevention programmes that target the general population... to build individual and communal resilience against radicalisation.”<sup>17</sup> And a growing body of research identifies that both **building resilience and establishing community-based interventions are crucial in preventing the violent forms of extremism that can lead to domestic terrorism**.<sup>18</sup> Where criminal justice approaches alone have not effectively prevented violent radicalization, public health strategies can address the root causes.<sup>19</sup> Scholars argue that **the best practice for governments is to pair law enforcement apprehension of bad actors with wide-spread primary prevention campaigns**. Such an approach allows for a combination of “social preventative and security perspectives”<sup>20</sup>

Several methods of primary prevention already have decades of data proving their effectiveness. Germany has pioneered a whole-of-society model, “proven, innovative, and in many respects exemplary” **for fostering democracy and respect while countering extremism**.<sup>21</sup> This German model builds **local centers for community engagement**, training, education, and intervention, all focused on the work of P/CVE. These German centers offer guidance and counsel to individuals and communities; the network of over 200+ such centers operating throughout Germany represents the best example of a public health, primary prevention approach to P/CVE. Community Centers inspired by the German model are currently being pioneered here in America, and their innovative work is supported by data from a recent set of case studies as “[s]olutions that utilize, combine, and empower local leader, residents, and organizations to actively mitigate existing and future political violence”.<sup>22</sup>

Another promising form of primary prevention can be seen in “prebunking” interventions. These come in the form of short educative messages, similar to public service announcements of the past. **Prebunking educates its audience about the methods of manipulation** used in extremist propaganda and the possible consequences of believing in it<sup>23</sup>. Over half a century of data shows that the prebunking method is effective, and ongoing work demonstrates that videos as short as 30-seconds can reduce viewers’ willingness to support false and harmful calls to action, undermine the credibility of those who spread these messages, and increase viewers’ emotional resistance. Cutting-edge work into the so-called “blanket of protection” effect may lead to even more scalability in this approach but require greater research before mass application.<sup>24</sup>



**Primary prevention of Domestic Terrorism was supported by both the Trump and the Biden Administrations.** President Trump’s 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls for the U.S. Government to, “champion and institutionalize prevention and create a global prevention architecture with the help of civil society.”<sup>25</sup> Likewise, in his 2021 National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, President Biden argued that engaging “in efforts to prevent individuals from being drawn into the grip of domestic terrorism” is “equally important” to prosecuting domestic terrorists.<sup>26</sup> There is broad support, beyond the realm of politics, for the type of local empowerment primary prevention allows. A recent survey concluded that most respondents believe “responsibility for hate fueled violence falls to communities,” with 91% of respondents underscoring support for community-led approaches to preventing extremism.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the crucial importance of establishing domestic infrastructure for this P/CVE work, this field of primary intervention against violent extremism is relatively new to the United States. Although there are studies proving the success of certain interventions,<sup>28</sup> and many interventions are appropriately paired with evaluation tools, there is a continuing need to ensure that all C/PVE projects both include evaluation techniques and are afforded adequate funding to ensure proper execution and reporting of this research.<sup>29</sup> Evaluating project and program efficacy is critical to any long-term success. Emerging program models need to include iterative feedback streams; they need to continually improve using constructive feedback from data analysis, community members, and all involved in decision-making. **Standardized evaluation measures should be developed for all prevention programs**, and applied uniformly across the P/CVE field (domestically and internationally) so that projects and programs can be adequately compared, and the most effective strategies can be identified. Such a commitment to evaluation would allow the P/CVE field to live up to President Biden’s call that the work can be, “grounded in existing evidence and best practices in public health.”<sup>30</sup>

**2023 saw the introduction of the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act (DTPA) in Senate bill 1591.**<sup>31</sup> The stated purpose of the bill is: “To authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to analyze and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.” The proposed legislation heavily prescribes the first two aspects of this work: the creation of a dedicated federal office, and the specifics of the work in which it is to engage. However, most of that work involves *post hoc* law enforcement reactions to domestic terrorism: “monitoring and analyzing” extremist activity; “prosecuting events” of domestic terrorism; reporting on incidents, threats, recoveries of weapons, and the like. The most upstream preventative effort in this legislation are its stipulations for the training of law enforcement officials. Despite the titular focus on “Prevention”, **there is little in this bill that would create**



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**appropriate avenues and funding for primary prevention work.** The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act provides important safeguards against the documented threat of domestic terrorism. We at PERIL, who pursue a public health approach to matters of preventing violent extremism, encourage the expansion of the bill to include, explicitly, the upstream, evidence-based, work of prevention. This could be achieved, generally, through incorporating the following principles:

- Creating a **Domestic Terrorism Section** with the Center for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships of the **Department of Health and Human Services**, to be responsible for implementing, testing, and scaling innovative evidence-based strategies to prevent domestic terrorism. This Section shall be an official member of the **Interagency Task Force** charged with reporting.
- Ensuring all reports and analysis include an **evaluation of national and local upstream, preventative work**, including data evaluation for projects and Federal funding avenues for P/CVE work.
- Creating avenues for **federal funding for evidence-based P/CVE work** that includes adequate funds for research and evaluation.<sup>32</sup>



## PERIL Suggestions for DPTA

*The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act provides important safeguards against the documented threat of domestic terrorism. We at PERIL, who pursue a public health approach to matters of preventing violent extremism, encourage the expansion of the bill to include, explicitly, the upstream, evidence-based, work of prevention.*

### **Sec. 3 (a), add as #4**

(4) DOMESTIC TERRORISM SECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.—There is an authorized Domestic Terrorism Section with the Center for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships of the Department of Health and Human Services, which shall be responsible for implementing, testing, and scaling innovative evidence-based strategies to prevent domestic terrorism.

*Such a change would require an emendation to the precis of the bill to read:*

To authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Health and Human Services to analyze and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.

*It would also require a revision of 3 as follows:*

SEC. 3. OFFICES TO COMBAT DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF OFFICES TO MONITOR, ANALYZE, PREVENT, INVESTIGATE, AND PROSECUTE DOMESTIC TERRORISM.—

### **Sec. 3 (b) (2), add as (D)**

(D) An analysis of national and local upstream, preventative work, including data evaluation for projects and Federal funding avenues for this work;





.....  
(Original Signature of Member)

118TH CONGRESS

2<sup>ND</sup> SESSION **H. R. 11**

To authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to analyze and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. SCHNEIDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 

**A BILL**

To authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to analyze and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.

*1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

This Act may be cited as the “Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2024”.



## SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act—

- (1) the term “Director” means the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
- (2) the term “domestic terrorism” has the meaning given the term in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code;
- (3) the term “Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee” means the committee within the Department of Justice tasked with assessing and sharing information about ongoing domestic terrorism threats;
- (4) the term “hate crime incident” means an act described in section 241, 245, 247, or 249 of title 18, United States Code, or in section 901 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3631);
- (5) the term “Secretary”, except as otherwise provided, means the Secretary of Homeland Security; and (6) the term “uniformed services” has the meaning given the term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.

## SEC. 3. OFFICES TO COMBAT DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

2 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF OFFICES TO MONITOR, ANALYZE, INVESTIGATE, AND PROSECUTE DOMESTIC TERRORISM.—

- (1) DOMESTIC TERRORISM UNIT.—There is authorized a Domestic Terrorism Unit in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security, which shall be responsible for monitoring and analyzing domestic terrorism activity.
- (2) DOMESTIC TERRORISM OFFICE.—There is authorized a Domestic Terrorism Office in the Counterterrorism Section of the National Security Division of the Department of Justice—



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(A) which shall be responsible for investigating and prosecuting incidents of domestic terrorism;

(B) which shall be headed by the Domestic Terrorism Counsel; and

(C) which shall coordinate with the Civil Rights Division on domestic terrorism matters that may also be hate crime incidents.

(3) DOMESTIC TERRORISM SECTION OF THE FBI.—There is authorized a Domestic Terrorism Section within the Counterterrorism Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which shall be responsible for investigating domestic terrorism activity.

(4) STAFFING.—The Secretary, the Attorney General, and the Director shall each ensure that each office authorized under this section in their respective agencies shall—

(A) have an adequate number of employees to perform the required duties;

(B) have not less than one employee dedicated to ensuring compliance with civil rights and civil liberties laws and regulations; and,

(C) require that all employees undergo annual anti-bias training.

(5) SUNSET.—The offices authorized under this subsection shall terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of enactment of this Act.

(b) JOINT REPORT ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM.—

(1) BIENNIAL REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and each 6 months thereafter for the 10-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, the Attorney General, and the Director shall submit a joint report authored by the domestic terrorism offices authorized under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) to—

(A) the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and,



(B) the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) CONTENTS.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of the domestic terrorism threat posed by White supremacists and neo-Nazis, including White supremacist and neo-Nazi infiltration of Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and the uniformed services;

(B)(i) in the first report, an analysis of incidents or attempted incidents of domestic terrorism that have occurred in the United States since April 19, 1995, including any White-supremacist-related incidents or attempted incidents; and

(ii) in each subsequent report, an analysis of incidents or attempted incidents of domestic terrorism that occurred in the United States during the preceding 6 months, including any White-supremacist-related incidents or attempted incidents;

(C) a quantitative analysis of domestic terrorism for the preceding 6 months, including—

(i) the number of—

(I) domestic terrorism related assessments initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including the number of assessments from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacism;

(II) domestic terrorism-related preliminary investigations initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including the number of preliminary investigations from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacism, and how many preliminary investigations resulted from assessments;



(III) domestic terrorism-related full investigations initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including the number of full investigations from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacy, and how many full investigations resulted from preliminary investigations and assessments;

(IV) domestic terrorism-related incidents, including the number of incidents from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacy, the number of deaths and injuries resulting from each incident, and a detailed explanation of each incident;

(V) Federal domestic terrorism related arrests, including the number of arrests from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacy, and a detailed explanation of each arrest;

(VI) Federal domestic terrorism related indictments, including the number of indictments from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacy, and a detailed explanation of each indictment;

(VII) Federal domestic terrorism related prosecutions, including the number of incidents from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacy, and a detailed explanation of each prosecution;

(VIII) Federal domestic terrorism-related convictions, including



the number of convictions from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacy, and a detailed explanation of each conviction; and,

(IX) Federal domestic terrorism related weapons recoveries, including the number of each type of weapon and the number of weapons from each classification and subcategory, with a specific classification or subcategory for those related to White supremacy; and,

(ii) an explanation of each individual case that progressed through more than 1 of the stages described under clause (i)—

(I) including the specific classification or subcategory for each case; and

(II) not including personally identifiable information not otherwise releasable to the public; and,

(D) certification that each of the assessments and investigations described under subparagraph (C) are in compliance with all applicable civil rights and civil liberties laws and regulations.

(3) HATE CRIMES.—In compiling a joint report under this subsection, the domestic terrorism offices authorized under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) shall, in consultation with the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, review each Federal hate crime charge and conviction during the preceding 6 months to determine whether the incident also constitutes a domestic terrorism-related incident.

(4) CLASSIFICATION AND PUBLIC RELEASE.—

Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be—



(A) unclassified, to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex only if necessary; and,

(B) in the case of the unclassified portion of the report, posted on the public websites of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(5) NONDUPLICATION.—If two or more provisions of this subsection or any other law impose requirements on an agency to report or analyze information on domestic terrorism that are substantially similar, the agency may produce one report that complies with each such requirement as fully as possible.

4 (c) DOMESTIC TERRORISM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.—There is authorized a Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee, which shall meet on a regular basis, and not less regularly than 4 times each year, to coordinate with United States Attorneys and other key public safety officials across the United States to promote information sharing and ensure an effective, responsive, and organized joint effort to combat domestic terrorism.

(d) FOCUS ON GREATEST THREATS.—The domestic terrorism offices authorized under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) shall focus their limited resources on the most significant domestic terrorism threats, as determined by the number of domestic terrorism-related incidents from each category and subclassification in the joint report for the preceding 6 months required under subsection (b).

#### **SEC. 4. TRAINING TO COMBAT DOMESTIC TERRORISM.**

(a) REQUIRED TRAINING AND RESOURCES.—The Secretary, the Attorney General, and the Director shall review the anti-terrorism training and resource programs of their



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respective agencies that are provided to Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, including the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Program that is funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the Department of Justice, and ensure that such programs include training and resources to assist State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting, deterring, and investigating acts of domestic terrorism and White supremacist and neo-Nazi infiltration of law enforcement and corrections agencies. The Attorney General shall make training available to Department prosecutors and to Assistant United States Attorneys on countering and prosecuting domestic terrorism. The domestic-terrorism training shall focus on the most significant domestic terrorism threats, as determined by the quantitative analysis in the joint report required under section 3(b).

(b) REQUIREMENT.—Any individual who provides domestic terrorism training required under this section shall have—

- (1) expertise in domestic terrorism; and
- (2) relevant academic, law enforcement, or other community-based experience in matters related to domestic terrorism.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act and twice each year thereafter, the Secretary, the Attorney General, and the Director shall each submit a biannual report to the committees of Congress described in section 3(b)(1) on the domestic terrorism training implemented by their respective agencies under this section, which shall include copies of all training materials used and the names and qualifications of the individuals who provide the training.

(2) CLASSIFICATION AND PUBLIC RELEASE.—





Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall—

- (A) be unclassified, to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex only if necessary;
- (B) in the case of the unclassified portion of each report, be posted on the public website of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and,
- (C) include the number of Federal incidents, investigations, arrests, indictments, prosecutions, and convictions with respect to a false report of domestic terrorism or hate crime incident.

#### **SEC. 5. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, the Director, the Secretary, and the Secretary of Defense shall establish an interagency task force to analyze and combat White supremacist and neo-Nazi infiltration of the uniformed services and Federal law enforcement agencies.

(b) **REPORT.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 1 year after the interagency task force is established under subsection (a), the Attorney General, the Secretary, and the Secretary of Defense shall submit a joint report on the findings of the task force and the response of the Attorney General, the Secretary, and the Secretary of Defense to such findings, to—

- (A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
- (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
- (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
- (D) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
- (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives;
- (F) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;



- (G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;  
and,
- (H) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(2) CLASSIFICATION AND PUBLIC RELEASE.—

The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be—

- (A) submitted in unclassified form, to the greatest extent possible, with a classified annex only if necessary; and,
- (B) in the case of the unclassified portion of the report, posted on the public website of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

**SEC. 6. FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR ADDRESSING HATE CRIME INCIDENTS WITH A NEXUS TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM.**

(a) COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE.—The Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice, authorized under section 1001(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000g), may offer the support of the Service to communities where the Department of Justice has brought charges in a hate crime incident that has a nexus to domestic terrorism.

(b) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.—Section 249 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

(c) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.—The Attorney General, acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall assign a special agent or hate crimes



liaison to each field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate hate crimes incidents with a nexus to domestic terrorism (as such term is defined in section 2 of the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2024).

**SEC. 7. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**

Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this Act, may be construed to authorize the infringement or violation of any right protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or an applicable provision of Federal law.

**SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.



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It should be noted that both the Departments of Justice and the Departments of the Treasury have programs and funding directed towards CVE work as well.

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