



Building Networks & Addressing Harm: A Community Guide to Online Youth Radicalization

Impact Study



POLARIZATION & EXTREMISM
RESEARCH & INNOVATION LAB

Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (PERIL)

PERIL's mission is to utilize a public health approach to design, test, and scale-up evidence-based tools and intervention strategies to prevent hate, bias, and extremist radicalization.

Southern Poverty Law Center

The SPLC seeks to be a catalyst for racial justice in the South and beyond, working in partnership with communities to dismantle white supremacy, strengthen intersectional movements and advance the human rights of all people.

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Key Findings

Significant improvements in addressing extremism

The findings of this impact study point to one conclusion: *Building Networks and Addressing Harm: A Community Guide to Online Youth Radicalization* is a highly effective and efficient tool to improve readers' ability to address extremism in their communities. Measures of awareness, knowledge and understanding of extremism, and of capacity, capability, willingness, and confidence to intervene in radicalization all increased for readers of the guide—in some cases, by enormous degrees.

There were some differences between demographic, geographic, and political groups and their responses to the guide. Not all participants in this impact study improved across all measures of effectiveness. Unequal effects across gender, racial and geographic groups suggest the need for more tailored tools with which to address the needs of each specific readership. However, the clear, overall effectiveness of the guide far outweighed these differentials. In short: the *Building Networks* guide **works**.

Takeaways

- 1. It took just over 12 minutes** for trusted adults to acquire the information, skills and confidence needed to successfully address issues of extremism with the youth in their lives.
- 2. 85% of participants felt that they understood the process by which youth become radicalized** online either “mostly” or “a great deal.”
- 3. Overall, 84% of participants were “mostly” or “greatly” satisfied** with the guide.
- 4. 84% said they could use and apply the resources** provided in the guide. Women reported being more able to use and apply the guide than men (see below).
- 5. The guide was favored equally by both political parties.** Democrats reported being more able to use and apply the guide than Republicans. Democrats and Republicans did not have a statistically significant difference in overall satisfaction with the guide.
- 6. 83% of participants felt they knew where to get help** after taking the study if they suspected a young person had come into contact with an extremist influence.
- 7. Participants reported a 35% increase in their overall awareness** of extremism-related topics. Each dimension of awareness tested in this study saw a significant increase.
 - Awareness of the term “filter bubble” increased by 234%,
 - Awareness of the term “moral disengagement” increased by 119%
 - Awareness of the term “the Great Replacement” increased by 107%.
- 8. Capacity to address extremism increased by 29%** after reading the resource; i.e., respondents learned how to access tools, resources and information related to dealing with extremism.
- 9. Confidence in engaging with youth on topics of extremism rose 11%** after reading the guide.
- 10. There was a significant increase (10%) in overall knowledge** of extremism-related definitions and concepts after participants read the guide. Each specific concept related to extremism saw participants across varying professions, demographics, geographies and political leanings increase their knowledge as well.
 - **The guide was particularly useful for mental health providers.** School counselors and mental health professionals had significantly better post-test knowledge accuracy than non-counselors and non-mental health professionals.
 - **Women learned more than men from this guide.** Women (92%) had significantly better post-test knowledge accuracy than men (89%) and were more satisfied (87% at least “mostly satisfied”) with the guide than men (80% at least “mostly satisfied”).
 - **Suburbanites learned more than city dwellers.** Participants who live in suburbs had significantly better post-test knowledge accuracy than participants who live in large cities.
 - **Democrats learned more than Republicans.** Democrats (92%) had significantly better post-test knowledge accuracy than Republicans (88%).

84%
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11. Capability to engage with youth on topics of extremism increased significantly (7%) after reading the guide.

- **Participants living in rural areas (rural, in-town; and rural, outside of town) reported significantly greater post-guide capability than participants who live in large cities.**

12. Willingness to engage youth on extremism-related topics rose significantly (6%) after reading the guide. Generally speaking, the older a participant was, the greater their willingness to engage youth on extremism-related topics.

13. Mentors reported significantly greater feelings of capacity, capability, confidence and willingness to address extremism with young people after reading the guide, compared to non-mentors.

14. Hispanic or Latino/a identifying participants reported slightly higher understanding of the process by which youth become radicalized, were more prepared to talk with youth about extremism after reading the guide and reported more knowledge of where to get help than white identifying participants.

15. Participants who live in rural areas outside of towns felt more prepared to talk with youth about online extremism and reported being more likely to intervene with youth they suspect are in contact with extremist values than participants in large cities.

“Mentors reported significantly greater feelings of capacity, capability, confidence and willingness to address extremism with young people after reading the guide, compared to non-mentors.”

Executive Summary

Findings in Detail

The following takeaways offer more detail on the effectiveness of *Building Networks* guide, as well as variations in impact. These findings are particularly important for future work. They identify gaps in effectiveness, which point to areas for future expansion and improvement. One particularly promising finding: mental health providers especially benefited from the guide. As we work to shift anti-extremism efforts away from incarceration and surveillance-reliant approaches and toward a resilience and public-health approach, these community members will be essential.

Youth Caregiver Roles & Professions Addressed in the Building Networks Guide

- Extended family member (other than parent/guardian/primary caregiver)
- Youth mentor
- Coach
- Extracurricular adviser.
- School guidance counselor
- After-school caregiver (e.g., babysitter, tutor, camp counselor)
- Religious community member
- Mental health professional

Completion Time

1. It took just over 12 minutes for youth mentors to acquire the information, skills and confidence needed to successfully address issues of extremism with the youth(s) in their lives.
2. There was no relationship between type of caregiver and time to complete reading the guide.

“It took just over 12 minutes for youth mentors to acquire the information, skills and confidence needed to successfully address issues of extremism with the youth(s) in their lives.”

3. Geographic region, political party affiliation and political orientation were all unrelated to completion time.

4. Higher education levels, higher incomes and younger age were associated with faster time to complete.

- Black/African American and Hispanic or Latino/a participants took longer than white participants to complete the study.

Content-Information Level

Awareness:

- Participants reported a 35% increase in their overall awareness of extremism-related topics after reading the *Building Networks* guide, and each component of awareness tested saw a significant increase.
 - 74% of participants who were previously unsure or not aware became aware of filter bubbles.
 - 45.39% of participants who were previously unsure or not aware became aware of scientific racism.
 - 65.17% of participants who were previously unsure or not aware became aware of moral disengagement.
 - 57.23% of participants, who were previously unsure or not aware, became aware of the Great Replacement conspiracy theory.
- More educated participants were more aware of extremism-related topics after reading the guide than less educated participants.
- Democrats were significantly more aware post-test than Republicans.

- Controlling for all other conditions, stronger identification as left-wing political orientation (measured from 1 [Strongly left-wing] to 4 [Middle-of-the-road/Undecided/Other] to 7 [Strongly right-wing]) predicted pre-test awareness.

- While not statistically significant, participants in suburbs were marginally more aware post-test than participants in large cities.

Knowledge:

- There was a significant increase (10%) in overall knowledge of extremism-related definitions and concepts after participants read the *Building Networks* guide. Participants increased their knowledge of each specific concept related to extremism as well.
- Participants reported a major increase (40%) in their understanding that law enforcement should be used only as a last resort in situations where a young person was harmed or targeted by radicalized individuals.
- Those in the inner-circle of youth¹ support reported a sizable increase (13.4%) in their knowledge of strategies and recommendations that can be used to engage with youth on topics of radicalization and extremism.

Action-Behavior Intention

1. Capacity to address extremism increased by 29% overall after reading the resource; i.e. participants' access to tools, resources and information related to extremism. In particular, mentors reported greater capacity than non-mentors, after reading the guide.
2. Capability to engage with youth on topics of extremism increased significantly (7%) after reading the resource.

3. Confidence in engaging with youth on topics of extremism rose 11% overall after reading the *Building Networks* guide.
4. Willingness to engage youth on extremism-related topics rose significantly (6%) overall after reading the *Building Networks* guide.

Action-Behavior Intention Findings by Demographics

1. Mentors reported significantly greater feelings of capacity, capability, confidence and willingness to address extremism with young people after reading the guide, compared to non-mentors.
2. The older a participant was, the greater was their post-guide willingness to engage youth on extremism-related topics. This pattern also applied to a marginally better (but not statistically significant) capability to engage youth and marginally better confidence in engaging with youth.
3. Participants living in rural areas (rural, in-town; and rural, outside of town) reported significantly greater post-guide capability than participants who live in large cities. Both groups of participants also reported marginally greater post-guide confidence and marginally greater post-guide willingness to engage with youth on topics of extremism than participants who live in large cities, although neither of these relationships were significant.
4. Participants who identified as Black/African American reported marginally more post-guide capacity than white-identifying participants, although this relationship was not statistically significant.

Post-Test Evaluation

1. Overall, 84% of participants were “mostly” or “greatly” satisfied with the *Building Networks* guide.

1 A young person's inner circle is defined in the *Building Networks* guide as a network of support that typically includes direct or extended family members, such as aunts, uncles, grandparents, older brothers, sisters or cousins. These caregivers can also include youth mentors, coaches, guidance counselors and mental health professionals. All of these people can play a key role in the lives of youth, whether the mentoring is inside or outside the home, formally structured or not.

- Older participants were more satisfied with the guide overall than younger participants.
 - Women were overall more satisfied with the guide than men.
 - Less educated participants were more satisfied with the guide than more educated participants.
 - Democrats and Republicans did not have a statistically significant difference in overall satisfaction with the guide.
2. **85% of participants felt that they understood the process by which youth become radicalized online “mostly” or “a great deal” after reading the guide.**
 3. **77% of participants feel “mostly” or “a great deal” prepared to talk with youth about online extremism.**
 4. **76% said they felt “mostly” or “greatly” prepared to intervene with youth that they suspect are in contact with extremist values.**
 5. **83% of subjects felt they knew where to get help if they suspected a minor was coming into contact with extremist ideas.**
 6. **84% said they could use and apply the resources provided in the guide.**
 7. **Women reported being more able to use and apply the guide than men.**
 8. **Democrats reported being more able to use and apply the guide than Republicans.**

Post-Test Evaluation Findings by Demographics

1. **Mentors** reported significantly greater feelings of capacity, capability, confidence and willingness to address extremism with young people after reading the guide, compared to non-mentors.
2. **Older participants** were more satisfied with the *Building Networks* guide. After reading the guide, they reported feeling more prepared to talk with youth about online extremism, more likely to intervene with youth that they suspect are in contact with extremist values, more knowledgeable about where to get help and more able to use and

83%

of subjects felt they knew where to get help

apply the resources provided in the guide than younger participants.

3. **Hispanic or Latino/a identifying participants reported slightly higher understanding** of the process by which youth become radicalized, were more prepared to talk with youth about extremism and reported more knowledge of where to get help than white-identifying participants.
4. **Participants who live in rural towns reported slightly higher understanding** of the process by which youth become radicalized and reported being more able to use and apply the resources provided in the guide compared to adults living in large cities.
5. **Participants who live in rural areas outside of towns felt more prepared to talk** with youth about online extremism and reported being more likely to intervene with youth they suspect are in contact with extremist values than participants in large cities.

Building on Past Work

In the summer of 2020, PERIL worked in partnership with the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) to create *Building Resilience & Confronting Risk in the COVID-19 Era: A Parents and Caregivers Guide to Online Radicalization*. This guide equipped parents, guardians and direct caregivers of young people with the knowledge and tools to better understand and respond to online youth radicalization. As part of PERIL's 360° iterative model, resources such as the *Parents and Caregivers* guide continue to be refined through impact studies, community member feedback sessions and expert review. This process is to ensure that the resources created adequately meet the needs of community members identified during initial listening sessions and that the resources do not harm communities in any way. Iteration ensures that these resources effectively work toward healthier, more resilient communities that feel empowered and better equipped to prevent extremist radicalization.

During the winter and spring of 2021, PERIL conducted an impact study of the *Parents and Caregivers* guide, which included 13 feedback sessions with teachers and educators, school counselors, social workers, coaches, mentors and youth group leaders. These focus groups provided critical feedback on the first edition of the *Parents and Caregivers* guide and provided additional insights into each group's specific needs in working to prevent radicalization in young people. Additional, supplemental inserts were created to address the needs of these populations in the summer of 2021. However, additional efforts were required to fully meet the needs of all community members beyond just parents and caregivers.

Released in June 2021, this partnership's impact study on the *Parents and Caregivers* guide surveyed 755 adults and showed that after reading the guide for seven minutes, parents improved their knowledge and understanding of extremism and youth radicalization. Every extra minute helped, too; the longer people spent reading the guide, the more they learned and the more confident they felt in their ability to intervene.

Women in that study spent significantly more time reading the guide, learned significantly more than men did and completed the study significantly more willing to intervene on behalf of young people coming

into contact with extremism. This speaks to the crucial role mothers, grandmothers, aunts and other women mentors can play in preventing or interrupting extremist radicalization. It also exposed the need for fathers, grandfathers, uncles and other male caregivers to invest more deeply in preventing youth radicalization.

Every adult in a young person's support network can positively shape that young person's growth and development. Doing so is vital to help young people avoid manipulation by supremacist ideologies, propaganda, misogyny, moral disengagement, mis- and disinformation and conspiracy theories. Trusted, respected adults who are not parents or guardians play a critical role in helping to raise a new generation committed to inclusion, unity and a free, diverse, democratic society.

Much of this partnership's past and current work is focused on designing and refining an "upstream," "whole-of-community," preventative public health approach that is often absent in the field of preventing violent extremism. The partnership between PERIL and SPLC, therefore, emphasizes the importance of community members, equipped and empowered with safe, evidence-based resources, working together to build healthy, resilient communities that will more effectively prevent youth radicalization.

“Every adult in a young person’s support network can positively shape that young person’s growth and development.”

This approach focuses on the health and wellbeing of marginalized and historically targeted community members while providing the awareness, knowledge and skills for all to effectively intervene and help prevent extremist radicalization. Applying a whole-of-community model to extremism prevention, however, requires going beyond ensuring that only parents, caregivers and educators are equipped to prevent radicalization in their communities.

As such, the *Building Networks* guide expands resources beyond parents and caregivers. This new guide equips a wide range of community members with the knowledge to identify warning signs of exposure to radicalizing content, as well as the tools to help young people build resilience against it. This broader network of support exists inside and outside the home and includes adults who are not a child's parent or primary caregiver — extended family members, youth mentors, coaches, guidance counselors, after-school caregivers, mental health professionals and others. Like the *Parents and Caregivers* guide, the *Building Networks* guide works to equip these networks with effective strategies to help young people become less susceptible to recruitment by hate groups and extremists and to support and engage young people who display early warning signs of radicalization.

Strategies to help prevent youth radicalization typically focus only on youth susceptible to radicalization. As part of this partnership's efforts to prioritize support for marginalized and historically targeted community members, the *Building Networks* guide emphasizes strategies for supporting those who have been harmed, targeted and/or who are potential victims of individuals who profess hate and extremism.

This impact study continues to refine PERIL's 360° iterative model, testing the impact of the *Building Networks* guide on readers' awareness and knowledge, as well as action-behavioral intention to prevent and address extremist radicalization among youth. Not only does this impact study show how well the guide succeeded at increasing readers' awareness, knowledge and behavior-intention, it also opens new avenues for future inquiry. To create healthier communities that are more resilient to hate and extremism, we must continue to better educate, equip and empower networks of caregivers and trusted adults to support those who have been harmed by hate and extremism, as well as young people who are susceptible to such beliefs.

Building Networks Today

Extended family, trusted community members and other adult mentors in the lives of young people are at the forefront of building community resilience and preventing youth radicalization. There is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to prevent youth radicalization. But if we provide communities with the knowledge and skills both to recognize extremist radicalization and to intervene proactively and safely, these communities can build resilience on their own terms, in service of their own unique needs. Grandparents, youth mentors, after-school caregivers, coaches, school counselors, religious community members and mental health professionals —all working together — can protect children and adolescents from the hateful agendas of extremists and their propaganda.

The *Building Networks* guide is the end result of a methodical, evidence-based iterative process that began with focus groups engaging a variety of community members who care for and interact with young people. Through these focus groups, researchers identified gaps in community knowledge, which were addressed in this guide. We have now finished

testing the resources of the guide to empirically demonstrate their effectiveness in producing measurable improvement in knowledge and skills related to intervening to prevent radicalization and address its harms.

Reading the *Building Networks* guide leads to greater awareness of extremism-related topics and greater knowledge of extremism-related definitions and concepts. It equips trusted adults with increased capacities, capabilities, confidence and willingness to engage with youth on topics of extremism. The guide empowers adults to oppose extremists tactics that spread supremacist ideologies, propaganda, misogyny, moral disengagement, mis- and disinformation and conspiracy theories. In working toward safer, more inclusive and resilient communities, however, additional resources, interventions and tools will be required. Direct support and community-based training also will be required to further develop skills and knowledge to address harms resulting from incidents of extremism and to support victims or survivors of hate incidents.

Implications & Future Directions

As “digital natives,”² young people today have never known a life that was not heavily enmeshed with the online world. However, their facility with digital tools has not always translated into better media literacy. As they spend more time online, there is an expanding threat of youth radicalization by exposure to supremacist ideologies, propaganda, misogyny, mis- and disinformation and conspiracy theories. It is critical that we help communities with proven strategies to disrupt this process and build resilience. The *Building Networks* guide represents an evidence-based step in that direction. Trusted adults within a young person’s network of support who spent 12 minutes reading the guide were significantly more

aware of extremism-related topics and significantly more knowledgeable about extremism-related definitions and concepts. Results show that even a small time commitment can significantly improve subjects’ understanding of extremism and willingness to act on that increased knowledge. This suggests that a reduction in youth radicalization is possible when caregivers are provided with practical resources.

The *Building Networks* guide was developed to target the specific needs and unique roles that caregivers play in the life of children and adolescents. Research has shown that audience-tailoring leads to high levels of satisfaction with developed resources, to higher reader

2 See Tucker, Ian. “Douglas Rushkoff: ‘I’m thinking it may be good to be off social media altogether.’” *The Guardian*. February 12, 2016. While young people “have more facility with these networks and platforms as they are designed but they have less insight that they are designed environments” which often promote antisocial behaviors. www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/12/digital-capitalism-douglas-rushkoff

willingness to talk with youth about online extremism and to increased intention to intervene. These foundational, tangible skills are critical to averting the youth radicalization process before it begins, and that is the surest way to protect our communities from the harms extremists desire to inflict on them.

According to data analysis, the guide seemed to particularly help participants who are mentors (compared to non-mentors), older participants, Hispanic or Latino/a individuals (compared to white individuals) and rural (compared to large city) dwellers. This might also suggest the need to improve messaging of the guide toward adults who are non-mentors (e.g., family), younger, non-Hispanic and/or who live in large cities. Future resources can dig deeper, providing more specialized and relevant insights into the specific needs of each type of trusted caregiver.

Conversely, additional inquiry should be conducted on how best to combine different resources for collaboration between caregiver types, as part of a broader whole-of-community approach to extremism prevention. Future resources should continue

“Future resources can dig deeper, providing more specialized and relevant insights into the specific needs of each type of trusted caregiver.”

to explore the different levels of understanding, awareness and behavior intention of each caregiver type. Additional research should also explore geographic differences in content-information level and behavior intention. These factors can produce different social and cultural pressures on young people, either through increased exposure to extremist groups or a lack of exposure to people and experiences that may contradict extremist propaganda.

More research is needed to determine why some differences were statistically significant while others were not. For example:

- 1. 2020 Presidential Election:** Participants who did not vote in the 2020 election reported marginally worse capacity than supporters of then-candidate Joe Biden to address extremism, although this relationship was not statistically significant.
- 2. Family Members vs. Non-Family:** Extended family members reported marginally better post-guide capability than non-family adults.
- 3. Aftercare:** Afterschool trusted adults reported marginally better post-guide capability than non-afterschool trusted adults.
- 4. Athletics:** Coaches reported marginally greater post-guide confidence than non-coaches.

These marginal increases between caregiver types may indicate that these caregivers require different resources to better meet their specific needs in working to prevent extremism.

Future work should address the ways in which self-reported measures like capacity, capability, confidence and willingness are susceptible to socially desirable responding behavior, which can skew impact results. Further inquiries into what components of resources and resource types have the greatest impact on increasing awareness, knowledge and behavior-intention of youth caregivers are also necessary. Such inquiries will help to improve future resources to be more digestible and accessible, more informative and, ultimately, more empowering.

Appendix A: Methods

Survey Design

A new structure for evaluating the *Building Networks* guide was developed for the purposes of this impact study and to measure the impact of future resources developed in partnership with SPLC. This was necessary to further develop our inquiries into different groups' specific needs, such as where to improve resources to help them address youth radicalization. This new analytic approach distinguishes between awareness and knowledge as measures of content-information change before and after reading the guide. The new analytic approach also breaks down action-behavior intention into the four following components: capacity (**Do you know where to get help/access resources?**), capability (**Do you have the knowledge and skills necessary to help?**), confidence (**How confident are you that you could effectively help?**) and willingness to intervene (**How willing are you to actually intervene?**) on behalf of youth in preventing youth radicalization within a community.

Participants and Demographics

We recruited a total of 739 participants from the Prolific survey recruitment platform to participate in this study. Subjects self-reported their caregiver roles/types, with 429 identifying as an extended family member (other than parents/guardians/primary caregivers), 117 identifying as a youth mentor, 80 identifying as a coach, 77 identifying as an extracurricular advisor, 24 identifying as a school guidance counselor, 239 identifying as an after-school caregiver (e.g. babysitters, tutors, camp counselors), 75 identifying as a religious community member and 47 identifying as a mental health professional. All participants were screened for being 18+ years old, fluent in English, for being located within the U.S. and for being a member of at least one of the aforementioned caregiver roles/types. All participants reported current U.S. residence and nationality. Subjects reported the number of caregiver roles/types that they held, with 90% of subjects ($n=665$) holding 2 caregiver roles/types, 8.80% ($n=65$) holding 3 roles/types, 1.08% ($n=8$) holding 4 roles/types and 0.14% ($n=1$) holding 9 roles/types.

Selections of age ranges for youth under care were found to be fairly even, with 32.75% ($n=242$) of participants caring for youth ages 0-5, 49.26% ($n=364$) of participants caring for youth ages 6-11, 37.21%

($n=275$) of participants caring for youth ages 12-13 and 39.65% ($n=293$) of participants caring for youth ages 14-18. Participants were able to select multiple age categories for youth under their care, with 53.86% ($n=398$) participants selecting one age category for youth under their care, 32.34% ($n=239$) participants selecting two age categories for youth under their care, 8.93% ($n=66$) participants selecting three age categories for youth under their care and 3.38% ($n=25$) participants selecting four age categories for youth under their care.

The sample was relatively balanced across sexes, with 58.05% of the sample ($n=429$) identifying as female and 41.95% ($n=310$) identifying as male. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 84 with the average age of participants being 35.67. Subjects self-reported race with 67.03% ($n=494$) identifying as white, 8.68% ($n=64$) identifying as Black, 6.11% ($n=45$) identifying as Asian or Asian American, 6.38% ($n=47$) identifying as Hispanic or Latino/Latina, 0.81% ($n=6$) identifying as American Indian, Native American or Alaska Native, 0.41% ($n=3$) identifying as Indian, 0.27% ($n=2$) identifying as Middle Eastern, 10.04% ($n=74$) identifying as 2+ / Mixed Race/Ethnicity / Multiracial and 0.27% ($n=2$) identifying as "Other."

Data Cleaning Procedure

1. $N = 808$ Prolific participants completed the survey after removing test trials and empty rows
2. Removed $n = 2$ participants for taking the survey twice (and both times finishing $< 50\%$)
3. After merging main study data with demographic data:
 - $n = 60$ participants in main study data but not demographic data
 - $n = 15$ participants in demographic data but not main study data
 - These $n = 75$ were dropped while the $n = 746$ that matched main study data to demographic data were kept
4. Plan was then to remove participants with a survey duration time less than 1 standard deviation below the mean (195 seconds; ~ 3 minutes), but the above cleaning already cleaned out all participants under 195 seconds, so no further removal of participants was required.
5. $n = 3$ participants excluded for revoking consent (per the age variable)
6. $n = 4$ participants excluded for having expired data (per the age variable)

Final $N = 739$ participants

Participant Recruitment

Recruitment for this study was carried out in phases. In the first phase, a custom screener question was run on the Prolific platform. This screener asked participants to self-report their Prolific ID numbers, used to match demographics and response data collected by Prolific with survey responses of the *Impact Study Survey* and hosted on the Qualtrics survey platform. A split male-female sample of 4,000 potential participants were recruited for this custom screener, which was made available on Prolific's platform to respondents who live in the U.S. and who self-identified as fluent in English. All respondents on Prolific are individuals 18 and older. This initial screener question asked respondents:

“Do you take care of any minors under the age of 18 in any of the following capacities?”

- Extended family member (other than parent/guardian/primary caregiver)
- Youth mentor
- Coach
- Extracurricular advisor
- School guidance counselor
- After-school caregiver (e.g. babysitter, tutor, camp counselor)
- Religious community member
- Mental health professional”

Based on respondents' answers to this question (No; Yes; Unsure/Other), 1,622 respondents who selected “Yes,” as well as 29 individuals who selected “Unsure/Other” were included in a custom “allow list” to be used for the full *Building Networks* guide Impact Study. Only individuals who were part of the custom allow list were allowed to see and had the opportunity to take the *Building Networks* guide Impact Study survey. After review of the 37 responses for those who selected “Unsure/Other,” an additional 29 individuals were added to the custom allow list of the Impact Study Survey, and 8 individuals were not included. Regardless of their response, all 4,000 respondents received compensation for their participation in this screener.

Once the Impact Study was published on Prolific, the study became available to only those 1,655 individuals on the custom allow list. The study was active for participants to complete between November 28th, 2022 and December 14th, 2022. A total of 808 participants responded to the survey out of the 1,655 individuals eligible to take the survey on Prolific. After cleaning the data, the final sample size for the *Building Networks* guide Impact Study included 739 respondents. Participants were compensated for their completion of the study, with a median completion time of 26 minutes.

Materials & Measures

This impact study was built and developed on the Qualtrics online survey platform, which is used for survey hosting and data collection. The impact study assesses two distinct components of the guide's impact using the updated evaluation structure, content-information and action-behavior intention. Content-information is the participants' awareness of terms, concepts, ideas and their specific knowledge of the content presented. The action-behavior intention section is broken down into an individual's capacity, capability, confidence and willingness to intervene and help prevent youth radicalization. Each section of the guide has a corresponding knowledge subsection in the instrument, e.g., the *Warning Signs of Youth Radicalization* section of the guide has a corresponding subscale in the survey instrument. The measures are either multiple choice or choose all that apply.

Procedure

Within the Qualtrics-hosted survey, participants took a pre-test to assess their base level of content-information level (i.e., awareness, knowledge) and action-behavior intention (i.e., capacity, ability, confidence and willingness to intervene on behalf of a young person) with regard to youth extremist radicalization. Participants were then presented with a post-test with the same questions they answered in the pre-test. The knowledge subsections of the instrument included screenshots of the guide. There was one subsection of the survey instrument on awareness and eight knowledge subsections corresponding to the different sections of the guide. These subsections, along with four subsections of action-behavior intention (i.e., capacity, ability, confidence and willingness) related to intervening on behalf of young people, were compared from pre-test to post-test. Using this methodology, we determined subjects' aggregate change in awareness and knowledge about radicalization as well as capacity, capability, confidence and willingness to intervene. Finally, respondents answered a post-test wrap up section, answering questions on overall satisfaction with the guide and what they learned from reading it presented. Participants were reminded that their responses were anonymous and confidential; participants were not forced to make or leave a response for any question

within this survey with the exception of the informed confidentiality and consent agreement.

Data Analysis

The hypotheses and statistical tests to be used for analysis were recorded prior to analyzing any study data in order to ensure transparency and avoid questionable research practices (e.g., hypothesizing after results are known, "p-hacking", etc.). A quantitative analysis of survey responses was conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to analyze time to complete reading the guide, overall post-test awareness and knowledge and post-test wrap-up items. Linear regressions were also used for content-information level aggregate accuracy, action-behavior intention aggregate and for capacity, capability, confidence and willingness as related to action-behavior intention. Wilcoxon signed rank tests were used to analyze pre vs. post awareness (content-information level) and capacity (action-behavior intention). Paired samples t-tests were used to analyze pre vs. post-test knowledge for content-information level and capability, confidence and willingness for action-behavior intention.

“After cleaning the data, the final sample size for the Building Networks Guide Impact Study included 739 respondents.”

Demographics

Table 1. Sample Demographic Descriptive Statistics

Variable	<i>n</i>	(%)	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Range
Youth caregiver role / type (select all that apply)					
Extended family member (other than parent/guardian/primary caregiver)	429	58.05			
Youth mentor	117	15.83			
Coach	80	10.83			
Extracurricular advisor	77	10.42			
School guidance counselor	24	3.25			
After-school caregiver (e.g., babysitter, tutor, camp counselor)	239	32.34			
Religious community member	75	10.15			
Mental health professional	47	6.36			
Number of caregiver roles / types					
1	739	100			
2	665	89.99			
3	65	8.80			
4	8	1.08			
9	1	0.14			
Age of youth under care					
0-5	242	32.75			
6-11	364	49.26			
12-13	275	37.21			
14-18	293	39.65			
Number of youth age categories chosen					
0	11	1.49			
1	398	53.86			
2	239	32.34			
3	66	8.93			
4	25	3.38			

Variable	<i>n</i>	(%)	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Range
Demographics					
Age			35.67	12.98	18, 84
Sex					
Female	429	58.05			
Male	310	41.95			
Race / Ethnicity					
White	494	67.03			
Asian or Asian American	45	6.11			
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0	0.00			
Black or African American	64	8.68			
Hispanic or Latino / Latina	47	6.38			
Other / Mixed Race/Ethnicity	87	11.80			
American Indian, Native American, or Alaska Native	6	0.81			
Indian	3	0.41			
Middle Eastern	2	0.27			
Other (please specify)	2	0.27			
2+ / Mixed Race/Ethnicity / Multiracial	74	10.04			
Education					
			4.27	1.44	1, 8
Less than high school diploma	7	0.95			
High school diploma or equivalent	80	10.91			
Some college	183	24.97			
Associate's degree	64	8.73			
Bachelor's degree (e.g., B.A., B.S.)	271	36.97			
Master's degree (e.g., M.A., M.S.)	105	14.32			
Professional degree (e.g., J.D., M.D.)	9	1.23			
Doctorate degree (e.g., Ph.D., Ed.D.)	14	1.91			
Household income					
			9.90	4.30	1, 18
Less than \$5,000	22	2.99			
\$5,000 to \$9,999	19	2.5			
\$10,000 to \$14,999	26	3.53			
\$15,000 to \$19,999	26	3.53			

Variable	<i>n</i>	(%)	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Range
\$20,000 to \$24,999	42	5.70			
\$25,000 to \$29,999	41	5.56			
\$30,000 to \$34,999	44	5.97			
\$35,000 to \$39,999	35	4.75			
\$40,000 to \$49,999	62	8.41			
\$50,000 to \$59,999	72	9.77			
\$60,000 to \$74,999	85	11.53			
\$75,000 to \$84,999	36	4.88			
\$85,000 to \$99,999	57	7.73			
\$100,000 to \$124,999	60	8.14			
\$125,000 to \$149,999	46	6.24			
\$150,000 to \$174,999	23	3.12			
\$175,000 to \$199,999	15	2.04			
\$200,000 or more	26	3.53			

Relationship status

Single	272	36.91
In relationship	419	56.85
Dating / romantic relationship	113	15.33
Living with partner / domestic partners	110	14.93
Married	196	26.59
Former relationship	46	6.24
Separated	8	1.09
Divorced	31	4.21
Widowed	7	0.95
Other (please specify)	0	0.00

Environmental density

Rural, outside of town	63	8.53
Rural, in-town	72	9.74
A suburb or exurb near a city	276	37.35
A small or medium-sized city	172	23.27
A large city	156	21.11

Variable	<i>n</i>	(%)	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Range
Strength of political identity			3.06	1.73	1, 7
Strong Democrat	179	24.25			
Moderate Democrat	145	19.65			
Leans Democrat	116	15.72			
Independent / None / Other	163	22.09			
Leans Republican	50	6.78			
Moderate Republican	53	7.18			
Strong Republican	32	4.34			
Political orientation			2.91	1.88	1, 7
Strongly left-wing	217	29.40			
Moderately left-wing	203	27.51			
Slightly left-wing	31	4.20			
Middle of the road / Undecided / Other	146	19.78			
Slightly right-wing	38	5.15			
Moderately right-wing	60	8.13			
Strongly right-wing	43	5.83			
2020 Presidential Election Vote					
Donald Trump	132	17.91			
Joe Biden	461	62.55			
Other	26	3.53			
Howie Hawkins	8	1.09			
Jo Jorgensen	15	2.04			
Other (please specify)	3	0.41			
Did not vote	118	16.01			
I was unable to vote in this election	35	4.75			
I was able to, but did not vote in this election	83	11.26			

Note. *SD* = standard deviation; Range = lower limit, upper limit.

Appendix B: Results

RQ1: Is there a relationship between reading the current version of the guide and changes in the level of awareness participants possess about radicalization through hate, discrimination, extremist rhetoric, violence, drivers of youth susceptibility and warning signs of youth radicalization?

A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare self-reported awareness of radicalization concepts before and after exposure to the *Building Networks* guide on a 16-point scale. There was a significant increase between the pre-test ($M = 9.40, SD = 3.50$) and post-test ($M = 15.05, SD = 2.08$) conditions; $t(738) = -44.11, p < .001$. These results suggest that reading the resource significantly improved subjects' reported awareness of extremism-related concepts. Specifically, subjects saw their awareness scores improve from 58.75% to 94.06% - a 35% increase across the study.

RQ2: Is there a relationship between reading the current version of the guide and having increased knowledge of how to prevent and address extremist radicalization amongst youth?

A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare knowledge of specific radicalization definitions before and after exposure to the *Building Networks* guide on a 15-point scale. There was a significant overall increase between the pre-test ($M\% = 81.31, SD = 13.18$) and post-test ($M\% = 90.87, SD = 10.92$); $t(738) = -26.50, p < .001$. These results suggest that reading the resource significantly improved subjects' knowledge of extremism-related definitions. Specifically, subjects saw their knowledge scores improve from 81.31% to 90.87% - a 9.56% increase across the study.

RQ3: To what extent does reading the current version of the guide affect participants' capacity to engage in actions related to extremism prevention with youth?

A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare the capacity of subjects to engage on topics of radicalization before and after exposure to the *Building Networks* guide on a 8-point scale. There was a significant increase between the pre-test ($M = 4.94, SD = 2.60$) and post-test ($M = 7.26, SD = 1.56$) conditions; $t(736) = -24.64, p < .001$. These results suggest that reading the resource significantly improved subjects' self-reported capacity to intervene in extremism-related situations. Specifically, subjects saw their capacity scores improve from 61.75% to 90.75% - a 29% increase across the study.

RQ4: Is there a relationship between reading the current version of the guide and having an increased capability to engage in extremist topics and understand how to engage young people who display warning signs of radicalization?

A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare the self-reported capability of subjects to engage on topics of radicalization before and after exposure to the *Building Networks* guide on a 5-point scale. There was a significant increase between the pre-test ($M = 2.86, SD = 0.79$) and post-test ($M = 3.23, SD = 0.74$) conditions; $t(734) = -15.88, p < .001$. These results suggest that reading the resource significantly improved subjects' self-reported capability to intervene in extremism-related situations. Specifically, subjects saw their capability scores improve from 57.20% to 64.60% - a 7.40% increase across the study.

RQ5: After reading the most current version of the guide, do the participants in this study have increased confidence to hold conversations with the youth they believe have been radicalized online? Did any aspects of the guide inhibit one's confidence to have these conversations?

A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare subjects' confidence to engage on topics of radicalization before and after exposure to the *Building Networks* guide on a 5-point scale. There was a significant increase between the pre-test ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 0.91$) and post-test ($M = 3.19$, $SD = 0.79$); $t(737) = -21.40$, $p < .001$. These results suggest that reading the resource significantly improved subjects' confidence to intervene in extremism-related situations. Specifically, subjects saw their confidence scores improve from 52.80% to 63.80% - a 11% increase across the study.

RQ6: To what extent are participants willing to have these difficult conversations when confronted with extremist rhetoric after reading the current version of the guide? Are participants willing to intervene on a micro (individual) and macro level to see who else in their specific community has been affected?

A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare subjects' willingness to engage on topics of radicalization before and after exposure to the *Building Networks* guide on a 5-point scale. There was a significant increase between the pre-test ($M = 2.95$, $SD = 0.94$) and post-test ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 0.85$); $t(738) = -13.01$, $p < .001$. These results suggest that reading the resource significantly improved subjects' self-reported willingness to intervene in extremism-related situations. Specifically, subjects saw their confidence scores improve from 59% to 65.40% - a 6.40% increase across the study.

Note. The survey used for impact study testing names the "Community Guide," which is referred to as the "Building Networks Guide" in the narrative of this report above.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Time to Complete.

Variable	<i>n</i>	(%)	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Range
Survey Metrics					
Survey duration (seconds) • Median = 1539			1833.89	1424.47	219, 25117
Guide page reading duration (seconds) • Total Median = 724.80			900.01	696.23	4713, 9803.53
Extremism definition • Median = 110.60			145.26	133.72	5.72, 1119.20
Introduction to youth radicalization • Median = 124.16			176.58	293.24	5.84, 6512.91
Drivers of youth susceptibility to extremist radicalization • Median = 30.65			53.94	95.98	5.64, 1866.34
Warning signs of youth radicalization • Median = 82.77			150.44	172.62	5.64, 1219.00
Responding to hate, discrimination, extremist rhetoric and violence • Median = 77.24			106.15	96.52	5.76, 897.77
Strategies and recommendations: Inner circle of youth support • Median = 71.33			85.05	75.86	5.69, 932.79
Strategies and recommendations: Close support network • Median = 54.84			75.30	73.72	5.61, 782.71
Strategies and recommendations: Extended support network • Median = 76.38			107.29	109.63	5.55, 1179.98

Note. *SD* = standard deviation; Range = lower limit, upper limit.

Time to Complete

Mean and median times to complete the guide as a whole, broken down by section are reported above in Table 2. Table 3. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting time to complete reading the guide (seconds).

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	32.22	57.02	.05	.08	-.11	.21	.572
Mentor	-102.17	72.50	-.15	.10	-.35	.06	.159
Coach	-52.64	85.60	-.08	.12	-.32	.17	.539
Advisor	7.11	86.87	.01	.12	-.23	.26	.935
Counselor	-85.02	145.58	-.12	.21	-.53	.29	.559
After school	52.56	56.54	.08	.08	-.08	.23	.353
Religion	-63.25	87.39	-.09	.13	-.34	.16	.469
Mental health professional	-168.51	108.68	-.24	.16	-.55	.06	.121
Age	12.90	2.18	.24	.04	.16	.32	< .001
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	13.64	53.60	.02	.08	-.13	.17	.799
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	69.28	110.92	.10	.16	-.21	.41	.532
Black or African American	196.45	93.38	.28	.15	.02	.55	.036
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	234.59	107.68	.35	.15	.05	.65	.024
Other / Mixed	47.87	80.71	.07	.12	-.16	.30	.553
Education	-77.16	20.56	-.16	.04	-.24	-.08	< .001
Household Income	-14.31	6.31	-.09	.04	-.16	-.01	.024
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	-110.77	106.26	-.16	.15	-.46	.14	.298
Rural, in-town	21.22	101.13	.03	.15	-.25	.32	.834
A suburb or exurb near a city	21.87	69.88	.03	.10	-.17	.23	.754
A small or medium-sized city	-35.74	76.34	-.05	.11	-.27	.16	.640
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	4.73	26.15	.01	.06	-.12	.14	.856
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	.001	23.61	< .001	.06	-.12	.12	1.00
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	-116.50	99.57	-.17	.14	-.45	.11	.242
Other	114.72	141.82	.16	.20	-.24	.56	.419
Did not vote	-65.39	79.32	-.09	.11	-.32	.13	.410
Constant	887.19	152.65	-.01	.13	-.27	.25	.916
Model Fit Statistics	F (35, 699) = 3.34, p < .001, R ² = .1068, Adjusted R ² = .0749						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Changes in Content-Information Level Awareness

Table 4. Awareness of Extremism Definitions, Descriptive Statistics & Pre- vs. Post-Guide Tests

Variable	Pre-test		Post-test		Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Pre-post change n				
	n	%	n	%	↓	0	↑	Z	p
Content “rabbit holes”					12	520	203	-13.03	< .001
No	141	19.08	17	2.31					
Unsure	82	11.10	16	2.18					
Yes	516	69.82	702	95.21					
Filter Bubbles					9	162	564	-22.61	< .001
No	458	62.23	26	3.52					
Unsure	139	18.89	25	3.39					
Yes	139	18.89	687	93.09					
Scientific Racism					12	320	405	-19.09	< .001
No	347	47.02	67	9.08					
Unsure	166	22.49	111	15.04					
Yes	225	30.49	560	75.88					
Male Supremacy					6	636	95	-8.86	< .001
No	50	6.77	6	0.81					
Unsure	53	7.17	8	1.09					
Yes	636	86.06	723	98.10					
Moral Disengagement					17	221	499	-20.55	< .001
No	312	42.28	25	3.39					
Unsure	210	28.46	16	2.17					
Yes	216	29.27	697	94.44					
The Great Replacement					4	303	431	-20.21	< .001
No	338	45.74	17	2.30					
Unsure	114	15.43	12	1.63					
Yes	287	38.84	709	96.07					

Supremacist Ideologies					6	621	108	-9.56	< .001
No	67	9.09	5	0.68					
Unsure	46	6.24	13	1.76					
Yes	624	84.67	719	97.56					

Unmoderated Environments / Under-Moderated Environments					12	400	325	-17.02	< .001
No	232	31.39	33	4.48					
Unsure	161	21.79	83	11.26					
Yes	346	46.82	621	84.26					

	Pre-test	Post-test	Paired Samples t-Test				
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Diff	SD	t	df	p
Overall Sum Awareness	9.40 (3.50)	15.05 (2.08)	-5.64	3.48	-44.11	738	< .001

Note. Diff = difference, *SD* = standard deviation; df = degrees of freedom; Overall awareness was summed across the eight items with “no” = 0, “unsure” = 1 and “yes” = 2, with a total range from 0 to 16 (higher = more aware); ↓ = how many people moved down the scale towards “no” from pre to post, 0 = how many people stayed the same from pre to post, ↑ = how many people moved up the scale towards “yes” from pre to post.

Table 5. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting overall post-test awareness

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.28	0.17	.13	.08	-.03	.30	.106
Mentor	-0.08	0.22	-.04	.10	-.25	.17	.698
Coach	-0.21	0.26	-.10	.12	-.34	.14	.424
Advisor	-0.05	0.26	-.02	.13	-.27	.22	.850
Counselor	-0.54	0.44	-.26	.21	-.67	.15	.218
After school	-0.23	0.17	-.11	.08	-.27	.05	.169
Religion	-0.16	0.26	.08	.13	-.17	.32	.547
Mental health professional	-0.42	0.33	-.20	.16	-.51	.11	.198
Age	-0.01	0.01	-.07	.04	-.16	.01	.069
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	-0.04	0.16	-.02	.08	-.17	.13	.791
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	0.23	0.33	.11	.16	-.21	.42	.497
Black or African American	-0.37	0.28	-.18	.14	-.44	.09	.187
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.03	0.32	.01	.16	-.29	.32	.931
Other / Mixed	0.09	0.24	.04	.12	-.18	.27	.704
Education	0.19	0.06	.13	.04	.04	.21	.003
Household Income	-0.02	0.02	-.05	.04	-.12	.03	.221
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.33	0.32	.16	.15	-.14	.46	.307
Rural, in-town	0.44	0.30	.21	.15	-.07	.50	.145
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.41	0.21	.20	.10	-.001	.40	.051
A small or medium-sized city	0.23	0.23	.11	.11	-.11	.33	.322
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.03	0.08	-.03	.07	-.16	.10	.669
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	-0.16	0.07	-.15	.06	-.27	-.02	.021
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	-0.04	0.30	-.02	.14	-.30	.27	.903
Other	0.34	0.43	.16	.21	-.24	.56	.431
Did not vote	-0.05	0.24	-.02	.11	-.25	.20	.831
Constant	15.25	0.46	-.12	.13	-.38	.14	.379
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 699) = 2.10, p = .001, R^2 = .0700, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0367$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Knowledge

Table 6. Knowledge Descriptive Statistics & Pre- vs. Post-Guide Paired Samples t-Tests

Variable	Pre-test		Pre-post change n		Accuracy (%) Paired Samples t-Test				
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	Diff	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Extremism Definitions									
Moral Disengagement									
Distancing yourself from someone for moral reasons.	87	11.77	22	2.98					
Avoiding talking to and interacting with people about their morals and values.	76	10.28	17	2.30					
The process of convincing yourself that ethical and moral standards do not apply to you.	479	64.82	655	88.63	23.81	52.59	-12.31	738	<.001
Using ethics and morals to justify disengaging with someone.	97	13.13	45	6.09					
Supremacist Ideologies									
Theories about the best societal norms, standards and lifestyles.	9	1.22	7	0.95					
Old cultural beliefs that glorify undeniable truths about beauty, wealth and life.	11	1.49	1	0.14					
Inherently better ideas or beliefs about society and how governments should work.	9	1.22	6	0.81					
Belief in the inherent superiority of any group over others and belief in the right of that group to dominate or exterminate those it views as lesser.	709	96.07	725	98.11	2.04	19.03	-2.90	737	.004
Introduction to Youth Radicalization									
Filter Bubbles									
A lack of competing views to the ideologies people encounter online or in person.	495	66.98	663	90.08	22.96	47.26	-13.18	735	<.001
An app that parents and caregivers can download to get rid of extremist content.	25	3.38	9	1.22					
A safety setting available on internet browsers that filter out hateful content.	212	28.69	60	8.15					
The name of an extremist website run by white supremacists.	7	0.95	4	0.54					

Variable	Pre-test		Pre-post change n		Accuracy (%) Paired Samples t-Test				
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	Diff	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Content Rabbit Holes									
An extremist website or forum where materials are created and shared.	59	7.98	24	326					
A gross picture of a rabbit that is meant to be shocking.	0	0.00	4	0.54					
A single, interesting article or persuasive piece of writing.	38	5.14	10	1.36					
Gradual encounters with increasingly extreme online content that is recommended to users by sites, platforms or apps.	642	86.84	699	94.84	8.00	36.17	-6.01	736	<.001

Driver of Youth Susceptibility to Extremist Radicalization

Feelings of victimization and grievance

Incorrect	57	7.71	22	2.98
Correct	682	92.29	717	97.02

Feeling that they do not belong in their community

Incorrect	35	4.74	715	96.75
Correct	704	95.26	24	3.25

Having experienced significant trauma in their past

Incorrect	90	12.18	26	3.52
Correct	649	87.82	713	96.48

Refusing to play video games or listen to podcasts

Incorrect	15	2.03	13	1.76
Correct	724	97.97	726	98.24

Overall Accuracy		93.33		97.12	3.79	14.46	-7.12	738	<.001
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Variable	Pre-test		Pre-post change n		Accuracy (%) Paired Samples t-Test				
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	Diff	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>

Warning Signs of Youth Radicalization

The Great Replacement

Replacing all male authority figures with female authority figures.	49	6.63	4	0.54					
A popular online video game played by extremists.	8	1.08	4	0.54					
The successful conversion of all atheists and non-religious people to organized religion.	49	6.63	11	1.49					
A 'white genocide' in which a white minority is politically oppressed and will eventually go extinct as a result of the actions from people of color.	633	85.66	720	97.43	11.77	33.89	-9.44	738	<.001

Male Supremacy

The belief that the supreme being in the entire universe is female and that without women running the world, the world will collapse.	9	1.22	6	0.81					
The belief that women are fundamentally inferior to men, and that women deserve punishment or violence for challenging traditional gender roles.	713	96.48	725	98.37	1.90	17.96	-2.87	736	.004
The belief that women should enslave the male race.	10	1.35	4	0.54					
The belief that women are just as capable as men and both genders deserve the same rights.	7	0.95	2	0.27					

Responding to Hate, Discrimination, Extremist Rhetoric & Violence

If a young person has been targeted by hateful behavior or content, when should this incident be addressed?

1. Only if they ask you to address the incident. If the young person does not ask, it means that they can handle it themselves.	14	1.89	6	0.82					
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Variable	Pre-test		Pre-post change n		Accuracy (%) Paired Samples t-Test				
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	Diff	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
2. Immediately. Incidents that are not dealt with immediately can negatively impact targeted youth's academic performance, increase social isolation and cause serious mental health problems.	662	89.52	706	96.05	6.53	29.27	-6.05	734	<.001
3. Wait to learn more about the content the young person has been exposed to and see if they are targeted by hateful behavior or content again.	56	7.58	20	2.72					
4. Never. It is important that young people learn how to handle these kinds of problems independently.	7	0.95	3	0.41					

When should law enforcement be used in situations where a young person was harmed or targeted by radicalized individuals?

1. Never. Use of law enforcement does not reduce radicalization and involvement with extremist groups.	20	2.71	12	1.62					
2. As a last resort. Use of law enforcement has little to no effect on reducing radicalization and involvement with extremist groups.	170	23.00	467	63.19	40.19	55.54	-19.67	738	<.001
3. As a first resort. Law enforcement-based solutions are the most effective in reducing radicalization and involvement with extremist groups.	132	17.86	79	10.69					
4. Whenever it is deemed necessary. Use of law enforcement can help reduce radicalization and involvement with extremist groups.	417	56.43	181	24.49					

Strategies & Recommendations: Inner-Circle of Youth Support

What are some ways that extended family can help young people avoid radicalization?

1. Ask questions from a place of curiosity, appeal to the young person's values and provide them access to information on digital literacy.	715	96.88	717	97.68	0.95	17.70	-1.46	732	.145
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Variable	Pre-test		Pre-post change n		Accuracy (%) Paired Samples t-Test				
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	Diff	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
2. Disregard any opinions that a young person expresses. Other family members may disagree with them.	2	0.27	1	0.14					
3. Isolate the young person when they share information that is concerning or that anyone believes to be untrue.	8	1.08	7	0.95					
4. Agree with everything a young person says. Keep them happy and close to ensure they do not feel isolated.	13	1.76	9	1.23					

Why are some young people more likely to speak honestly and exhibit vulnerability with mentors in ways that they may not be able to with their parents or caregivers?

1. Mentors often have more in common with the young person they are working with than other caregivers.

Incorrect	290	39.24	164	22.19
Correct	449	60.76	575	77.81

2. Young people often think that mentors will be more easily manipulated than their parents or caregivers.

Incorrect	68	9.20	54	7.31
Correct	671	90.80	685	92.69

3. Young people often do not think of mentors as authority figures in the same way as they do of parents or caregivers.

Incorrect	144	19.49	62	8.39
Correct	959	80.51	677	91.61

4. Mentors do not have the same capacity to punish young people as parents or caregivers.

Incorrect	433	58.59	259	35.05
Correct	306	41.41	480	64.95

Overall accuracy		68.37		81.77	13.40	23.99	-15.18	738	<.001
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Variable	Pre-test		Pre-post change n		Accuracy (%) Paired Samples t-Test				
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	Diff	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>

Strategies & Recommendations: Close Support Network

What is an advantage that sports coaches have in preventing radicalization amongst their players?

1. Physical activity can be a tool used to prevent players from speaking.	13	1.76	8	1.09					
2. The camaraderie and the emotional ups and downs of team sports bond young people and their coaches.	661	89.42	699	94.84	5.43	28.51	-5.17	736	<.001
3. Sports coaches can use running, suspensions from games or additional punishments as an incentive to behave.	49	6.63	19	2.58					
4. Sports bonds young people by making them hate the same ideas.	16	2.17	11	1.49					

How can school counselors use their role to help address youth radicalization?

1. By connecting teachers, parents/ caregivers and other professionals to create a support network of adults that are aware of issues the child is facing.	702	94.99	722	97.70	2.71	21.92	-3.36	738	.001
2. They can recommend suspensions to school administrators if they believe a young person is becoming radicalized.	18	2.44	5	0.68					
3. By warning friends and classmates that a young person is dangerous and should be avoided.	6	0.81	4	0.54					
4. They can pick and choose who is susceptible to youth radicalization based on their own expertise.	13	1.76	8	1.08					
Overall accuracy		92.22		96.14	3.92	19.78	-5.39	738	<.001

Strategies & Recommendations: Extended Support Network

How can after-school caregivers help identify signs of radicalization?

1. They can yell at youth for behaviors they believe are problematic.									
Incorrect	35	4.74	30	4.06					
Correct	704	95.26	709	95.94					

Variable	Pre-test		Pre-post change n		Accuracy (%) Paired Samples t-Test				
	n	%	n	%	Diff	SD	t	df	p
2. They can spot a young person's concerning interests as they are starting to develop.									
Incorrect	67	9.07	53	7.17					
Correct	672	90.93	686	92.83					
3. They may be able to identify harmful belief systems and behaviors in a young person's home environment.									
Incorrect	116	15.70	93	12.58					
Correct	623	84.30	646	87.42					
4. They may be able to identify harmful websites youth visit.									
Incorrect	225	30.45	332	44.93					
Correct	514	69.55	407	55.07					
Overall accuracy		85.01		82.81	-2.20	22.79	2.62	738	.009

Strategies & Recommendations: Extended Support Network

How can mental health professionals prevent radicalization among young clients and/or patients?

1. By coordinating care outside of the therapeutic setting and keeping youth engaged in the community.

Incorrect	182	24.63	109	14.75
Correct	557	75.37	630	85.25

2. They can recognize signs of mental illness and personality disorder.

Incorrect	142	19.22	173	23.41
Correct	597	80.78	566	76.59

3. They can develop strength-based approaches and focus on support and empowerment.

Incorrect	135	18.27	100	13.53
Correct	604	81.73	639	86.47

4. By offering resources and support to the family and/or extended support network of any youth vulnerable to radicalization.

Incorrect	67	9.07	74	10.01
Correct	672	90.93	665	89.99

Overall accuracy		82.21		84.57	2.37	22.98	-2.80	738	.005
	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Diff	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Knowledge Overall Accuracy (%)	81.31	13.18	90.87	10.92	+9.56	9.80	-26.50	738	<.001

Note. *SD* = standard deviation; *df* = degrees of freedom; *Diff* = absolute value of the difference; Overall knowledge was averaged across accuracy scores for all pre-guide (and separately for all post-guide) knowledge items.

Table 7. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting post-test knowledge accuracy (%).

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	-0.01	0.01	-0.09	.08	-.24	.07	.257
Mentor	-0.01	0.01	-.11	.10	-.30	.09	.283
Coach	-0.02	0.01	-.19	.12	-.42	.05	.116
Advisor	-0.004	0.01	-.04	.12	-.28	.19	.728
Counselor	-0.12	0.02	-1.08	.20	-1.47	-.69	< .001
After school	-0.01	0.01	-.06	.08	-.21	.09	.439
Religion	-0.002	0.01	-.02	.12	-.26	.21	.864
Mental health professional	-0.05	0.02	-.47	.15	-.77	-.18	.002
Age	0.0002	0.0003	.03	.04	-.05	.10	.497
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	0.01	0.01	.17	.07	.03	.32	.019
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	0.02	0.02	.18	.15	-.12	.48	.229
Black or African American	-0.05	0.01	-.48	.13	-.73	-.22	< .001
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.004	0.02	.04	.15	-.25	.33	.767
Other / Mixed	-0.02	0.01	-.17	.11	-.38	.05	.134
Education	0.003	0.003	.04	.04	-.04	.12	.368
Household Income	-0.001	0.001	-.02	.04	-.10	.05	.545
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	-0.02	0.02	-.14	.15	-.43	.15	.344
Rural, in-town	0.01	0.02	.12	.14	-.16	.39	.398
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.02	0.01	.21	.10	.02	.40	.030
A small or medium-sized city	0.01	0.01	.11	.11	-.10	.32	.294
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	0.01	0.004	.10	.06	-.02	.22	.101
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	-0.02	0.004	-.26	.06	-.38	-.14	< .001
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	-0.03	0.01	-.23	.14	-.50	.04	.089
Other	-0.02	0.02	-.23	.20	-.61	.16	.245
Did not vote	-0.02	0.01	-.21	.11	-.42	.01	.061
Constant	0.93	0.02	.11	.13	-.14	.36	.398
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 699) = 5.78, p < .001, R^2 = .1714, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .1418$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Action-Behavioral Intentions Capacity

Table 8. Action Behavioral Intentions (Capacity) Descriptive Statistics and Pre- vs. Post-Guide Tests.

Variable	Pre-test		Post-test		Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Pre-post change n				
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	↓	0	↑	<i>Z</i>	<i>p</i>
...have access to information regarding how to talk to young people about conspiracy theories, disinformation, or hate speech?					18	363	353	-17.32	< .001
No	212	28.77	23	3.13					
Unsure	211	28.63	99	13.45					
Yes	314	42.61	614	83.42					
...know where to find information and resources to help a minor understand divisive social and political issues?					19	379	335	-16.81	< .001
No	189	25.64	26	3.54					
Unsure	218	29.58	94	12.79					
Yes	330	44.78	615	83.67					
...know where to find resources on youth radicalization?					15	313	407	-18.90	< .001
No	243	33.02	28	3.79					
Unsure	232	31.52	81	10.98					
Yes	261	35.46	629	85.23					
...know where to get information about online safety?					19	544	169	-10.95	< .001
No	75	10.16	17	2.32					
Unsure	146	19.78	62	8.46					
Yes	517	70.05	654	89.22					
	Pre-test		Post-test		Paired Samples t-Test				
	Mean (SD)		Mean (SD)		Diff	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Overall sum capacity	4.94 (2.60)		7.26 (1.56)		2.32	2.55	-24.64	736	< .001

Note. Diff = absolute value of the difference; *SD* = standard deviation; *df* = degree of freedom; Overall capacity was summed across the four items with “no” = 0, “unsure” = 1 and “yes” = 2, with a total range from 0 to 8 (higher = more capacity).

Table 9. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting post-test capacity action behavioral intentions.

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _b	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.11	0.06	.14	.08	-.02	.31	.084
Mentor	0.17	0.08	.23	.11	.02	.44	.031
Coach	0.14	0.09	.19	.13	-.06	.43	.135
Advisor	0.07	0.09	.10	.13	-.15	.34	.449
Counselor	0.07	0.16	.09	.21	-.33	.51	.668
After school	0.11	0.06	.15	.08	-.02	.31	.078
Religion	-0.13	0.09	-.18	.13	-.43	.07	.154
Mental health professional	0.08	0.12	.11	.16	-.20	.42	.475
Age	0.004	0.002	.07	.04	-.01	.15	.084
Sex (ref = male)	0.02	0.06	.03	.08	-.13	.18	.721
Female							
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.35	0.12	-.47	.16	-.79	-.15	.004
Black or African American	-0.14	0.10	-.19	.14	-.45	.08	.172
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.14	0.12	.19	.16	-.12	.50	.229
Other / Mixed	-0.01	0.09	-.02	.12	-.25	.21	.875
Education	0.01	0.02	.02	.04	-.07	.10	.684
Household Income	0.01	0.01	.03	.04	-.04	.11	.384
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.25	0.11	.33	.16	.03	.64	.032
Rural, in-town	0.23	0.11	.31	.15	.02	.60	.038
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.08	0.08	.11	.10	-.09	.31	.267
A small or medium-sized city	-0.02	0.08	-.03	.11	-.25	.19	.783
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.02	0.03	-.04	.07	-.17	.09	.553
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	0.01	0.03	.04	.06	-.09	.16	.572
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	0.03	0.11	.04	.15	-.24	.33	.771
Other	0.11	0.15	.16	.21	-.25	.56	.450
Did not vote	-0.04	0.09	-.05	.12	-.28	.17	.648
Constant	2.80	0.16	-.26	.13	-.53	-.0004	.050
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 697) = 1.87, p = .007, R^2 = .0628, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0292$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Capability

Table 10. Action Behavioral Intentions (Capability) Descriptive Statistics & Pre- vs. Post-Guide Paired Samples t-Tests.

Variable	Pre-test			Pre-post change n			Paired Samples t-Test				
	n	%	Mean (SD)	n	%	Mean (SD)	Diff	SD	t	df	p
...identifying propaganda tactics that extremists use to recruit youth?			2.56 (1.08)			3.17 (0.87)	0.60	0.98	-16.64	730	< .001
Not at all	34	4.63		4	0.54						
A little bit	84	11.43		30	4.08						
Somewhat	199	27.07		115	15.65						
Mostly	265	36.05		277	37.69						
A great deal	153	20.82		309	42.04						
...helping a minor distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy news sources?			3.04 (0.91)			3.28 (0.81)	0.24	0.81	-8.10	733	< .001
Not at all	8	1.09		2	0.27						
A little bit	37	5.03		23	3.12						
Somewhat	131	17.80		86	11.67						
Mostly	304	41.30		283	38.40						
A great deal	256	34.78		343	46.54						
...informing a minor about good internet safety practices?			3.11 (0.91)			3.31 (0.82)	0.20	0.80	-6.74	731	< .001
Not at all	8	1.09		2	0.27						
A little bit	33	4.48		28	3.81						
Somewhat	120	16.30		71	9.66						
Mostly	284	38.59		274	37.28						
A great deal	291	39.54		360	48.98						
...calmly talking to a minor about online extremism without making them feel defensive?			2.72 (1.04)			3.15 (0.88)	0.44	0.87	-13.55	733	< .001
Not at all	21	2.85		6	0.82						
A little bit	76	10.31		32	4.35						
Somewhat	178	24.15		108	14.67						
Mostly	277	37.58		289	39.27						
A great deal	185	25.10		301	40.90						
Overall average capability			2.86 (0.79)			3.23 (0.74)	0.37	0.63	-15.88	734	< .001

Note. Diff = absolute value of the difference; SD = standard deviation; df = degree of freedom; Overall capacity was averaged across the four items with a range of 1 to 5.

Table 11. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting post-test capability action behavioral intentions.

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _b	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.11	0.06	.14	.08	-.02	.31	.084
Mentor	0.17	0.08	.23	.11	.02	.44	.031
Coach	0.14	0.09	.19	.13	-.06	.43	.135
Advisor	0.07	0.09	.10	.13	-.15	.34	.449
Counselor	0.07	0.16	.09	.21	-.33	.51	.668
After school	0.11	0.06	.15	.08	-.02	.31	.078
Religion	-0.13	0.09	-.18	.13	-.43	.07	.154
Mental health professional	0.08	0.12	.11	.16	-.20	.42	.475
Age	0.004	0.002	.07	.04	-.01	.15	.084
Sex (ref = male)	0.02	0.06	.03	.08	-.13	.18	.721
Female							
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.35	0.12	-.47	.16	-.79	-.15	.004
Black or African American	-0.14	0.10	-.19	.14	-.45	.08	.172
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.14	0.12	.19	.16	-.12	.50	.229
Other / Mixed	-0.01	0.09	-.02	.12	-.25	.21	.875
Education	0.01	0.02	.02	.04	-.07	.10	.684
Household Income	0.01	0.01	.03	.04	-.04	.11	.384
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.25	0.11	.33	.16	.03	.64	.032
Rural, in-town	0.23	0.11	.31	.15	.02	.60	.038
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.08	0.08	.11	.10	-.09	.31	.267
A small or medium-sized city	-0.02	0.08	-.03	.11	-.25	.19	.783
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.02	0.03	-.04	.07	-.17	.09	.553
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	0.01	0.03	.04	.06	-.09	.16	.572
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	0.03	0.11	.04	.15	-.24	.33	.771
Other	0.11	0.15	.16	.21	-.25	.56	.450
Did not vote	-0.04	0.09	-.05	.12	-.28	.17	.648
Constant	2.80	0.16	-.26	.13	-.53	-.0004	.050
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 697) = 1.87, p = .007, R^2 = .0628, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0292$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Confidence

Table 12. Action Behavioral Intentions (Confidence) Descriptive Statistics & Pre- vs. Post-Guide Paired Samples t-Tests.

Variable	Pre-test			Pre-post change n			Paired Samples t-Test				
	n	%	Mean (SD)	n	%	Mean (SD)	Diff	SD	t	df	p
... talk to a minor about how social media and digital platforms intentionally distort their perceptions of people, politics and society?			2.93 (1.01)			3.28 (0.86)	0.35	0.83	-11.36	736	< .001
Not at all	13	1.76		4	0.54						
A little bit	63	8.54		26	3.52						
Somewhat	139	18.83		96	13.01						
Mostly	272	36.86		246	33.33						
A great deal	251	34.01		366	49.59						
...talk to a minor about how edgy, offensive or shocking humor, as well as jokes and memes, can normalize hateful beliefs?			2.76 (1.07)			3.20 (0.93)	0.45	0.83	-14.53	737	< .001
Not at all	24	3.25		8	1.08						
A little bit	73	9.88		37	5.01						
Somewhat	170	23.00		98	13.28						
Mostly	265	35.86		249	33.74						
A great deal	207	28.01		346	46.88						
...identify behaviors that build resilience against radicalization in youth?			2.34 (1.13)			3.09 (0.91)	0.76	1.01	-20.35	733	< .001
Not at all	51	6.91		6	0.82						
A little bit	112	15.18		38	5.17						
Somewhat	233	31.57		119	16.19						
Mostly	222	30.08		290	39.46						
A great deal	120	16.26		282	38.37						
...identify red flags and warning signs of radicalization in a minor?			2.53 (1.05)			3.18 (0.86)	0.65	0.93	-18.87	736	< .001
Not at all	23	3.11		4	0.54						
A little bit	103	13.94		25	3.39						
Somewhat	217	29.36		118	16.01						
Mostly	251	33.96		279	37.86						
A great deal	145	19.62		311	42.20						
Overall average confidence			2.64 (0.91)			3.19 (0.79)	0.55	0.70	-21.40	737	< .001

Note. Diff = absolute value of the difference; SD = standard deviation; df = degree of freedom; Overall confidence was averaged across the four items with a range of 1 to 5.

Table 13. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting post-test confidence action behavioral intentions.

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.08	0.07	.10	.08	-.06	.27	.221
Mentor	0.18	0.08	.23	.11	.02	.44	.031
Coach	0.17	0.10	.21	.13	-.04	.46	.094
Advisor	-0.02	0.10	-.02	.13	-.27	.23	.866
Counselor	0.06	0.17	.08	.21	-.34	.50	.705
After school	0.04	0.07	.05	.08	-.11	.22	.508
Religion	-0.05	0.10	-.06	.13	-.31	.19	.637
Mental health professional	0.13	0.13	.17	.16	-.14	.48	.287
Age	0.004	0.003	.08	.04	-.002	.16	.057
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	0.08	0.06	.10	.08	-.06	.25	.221
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.24	0.13	-.31	.16	-.63	.01	.058
Black or African American	-0.05	0.11	-.07	.13	-.34	.20	.625
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.17	0.12	.21	.16	-.10	.52	.184
Other / Mixed	-0.09	0.09	-.11	.12	-.34	.12	.353
Education	0.0002	0.02	.0004	.04	-.08	.09	.993
Household Income	0.01	0.01	.04	.04	-.04	.12	.308
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.24	0.12	.30	.16	-.002	.61	.051
Rural, in-town	0.23	0.12	.29	.15	-.004	.58	.053
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.10	0.08	.13	.10	-.07	.33	.199
A small or medium-sized city	-0.06	0.09	-.08	.11	-.30	.14	.465
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.05	0.03	-.11	.07	-.24	.02	.110
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	-0.01	0.03	-.03	.06	-.15	.10	.693
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	0.11	0.12	.14	.15	-.14	.43	.322
Other	0.14	0.16	.17	.21	-.24	.58	.410
Did not vote	0.001	0.09	.001	.12	-.23	.23	.991
Constant	2.89	0.18	-.29	.13	-.56	-.03	.031
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 698) = 1.63, p = .028, R^2 = .0551, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0213$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Willingness

Table 14. Action Behavioral Intentions (Willingness) Descriptive Statistics & Pre- vs. Post-Guide Paired Samples t-Tests.

Variable	Pre-test			Pre-post change n			Paired Samples t-Test				
	n	%	Mean (SD)	n	%	Mean (SD)	Diff	SD	t	df	p
...talk to a minor about conspiracy theories, disinformation and hate speech?			3.03 (1.01)			3.31 (0.87)	0.28	0.79	-9.49	736	< .001
Not at all	16	2.17		7	0.95						
A little bit	45	6.09		24	3.26						
Somewhat	135	18.27		85	11.53						
Mostly	248	33.56		239	32.43						
A great deal	295	39.92		382	51.83						
...talk to a minor about recruitment and online radicalization if you suspected they were coming into contact with extremist groups or individuals on the internet?			2.84 (1.05)			3.23 (0.91)	0.39	0.85	-12.40	736	< .001
Not at all	18	2.44		7	0.95						
A little bit	66	8.93		35	4.75						
Somewhat	173	23.41		95	12.89						
Mostly	243	32.88		245	33.24						
A great deal	239	32.34		355	48.17						
...talk with a minor who is discussing extremist ideas without ridiculing or punishing them?			2.99 (1.03)			3.27 (0.92)	0.28	0.75	-10.02	738	< .001
Not at all	18	2.44		8	1.08						
A little bit	49	6.63		35	4.74						
Somewhat	139	18.81		85	11.50						
Mostly	251	33.96		236	31.94						
A great deal	282	38.16		375	50.74						
Overall average willingness			2.95 (0.94)			3.27 (0.85)	0.32	0.66	-13.01	738	< .001

Note. Diff = absolute value of the difference; SD = standard deviation; df = degree of freedom; Overall willingness was averaged across the three items with a range of 1 to 5.

Table 15. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting post-test willingness action behavioral intentions.

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.07	0.07	.09	.08	-.07	.25	.290
Mentor	0.24	0.09	.28	.11	.08	.49	.007
Coach	-0.02	0.11	-.02	.12	-.27	.22	.862
Advisor	-0.11	0.11	-.12	.13	-.37	.12	.326
Counselor	0.01	0.18	.01	.21	-.40	.43	.959
After school	0.0004	0.07	.0004	.08	-.16	.16	.996
Religion	-0.03	0.11	-.04	.13	-.29	.21	.778
Mental health professional	-0.02	0.13	-.03	.16	-.34	.28	.855
Age	0.01	0.003	.13	.04	.05	.21	.002
Sex (ref = male)	0.09	0.07	.11	.08	-.04	.26	.163
Female							
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.40	0.14	-.46	.16	-.78	-.15	.004
Black or African American	-0.19	0.12	-.22	.14	-.48	.05	.109
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.08	0.13	.10	.16	-.21	.41	.528
Other / Mixed	-0.04	0.10	-.05	.12	-.28	.18	.698
Education	0.01	0.03	.02	.04	-.06	.11	.593
Household Income	0.002	0.01	.01	.04	-.07	.09	.803
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.16	0.13	.19	.15	-.12	.49	.225
Rural, in-town	0.22	0.13	.26	.15	-.03	.55	.074
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.09	0.09	.10	.10	-.10	.30	.320
A small or medium-sized city	-0.06	0.09	-.08	.11	-.29	.14	.497
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.003	0.03	-.01	.07	-.13	.12	.932
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	-0.02	0.03	-.03	.06	-.16	.09	.606
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	-0.08	0.12	-.10	.14	-.38	.19	.503
Other	-0.04	0.18	-.04	.21	-.45	.36	.839
Did not vote	-0.12	0.10	-.14	.12	-.36	.09	.236
Constant	2.85	0.19	-.11	.13	-.37	.15	.408
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 698) = 1.63, p = .028, R^2 = .0551, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0213$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Post-Survey Wrap-Up Questions

Table 16. Post-Survey Wrap-Up Questions

Variable	<i>n</i>	(%)	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Range
...do you understand the process by which youth become radicalized online?			3.28	0.85	0, 4
Not at all	5	0.68			
A little bit	26	3.52			
Somewhat	82	11.11			
Mostly	273	36.99			
A great deal	352	47.70			
...do you feel prepared to talk with youth about online extremism?			3.07	0.93	0, 4
Not at all	9	1.22			
A little bit	39	5.31			
Somewhat	121	16.46			
Mostly	285	38.78			
A great deal	281	38.23			
...could you intervene with youth that you suspect are in contact with extremist values?			3.05	0.93	0, 4
Not at all	9	1.22			
A little bit	39	5.28			
Somewhat	130	17.59			
Mostly	286	38.70			
A great deal	275	37.21			
...do you know where to get help if you suspect a minor you know is coming into contact with extremist ideas?			3.20	0.87	0, 4
Not at all	9	1.22			
A little bit	26	3.53			
Somewhat	90	12.23			
Mostly	294	39.95			
A great deal	317	43.07			

Variable	<i>n</i>	(%)	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Range
...could you use and apply the resources provided in the guide?			3.28	0.85	0, 4
Not at all	6	0.81			
A little bit	23	3.12			
Somewhat	88	11.92			
Mostly	263	35.64			
A great deal	358	48.51			
Considering all the material you read, how satisfied are you with the Community Guide to Online Radicalization?			3.25	0.91	0, 4
Not at all	13	1.76			
A little bit	26	3.52			
Somewhat	78	10.57			
Mostly	269	36.45			
A great deal	352	47.70			
Note. <i>SD</i> = standard deviation; Range = lower limit, upper limit.					

Note. *SD* = standard deviation; Range = lower limit, upper limit.

To what extent do you understand the process by which youth become radicalized online?

Table 17. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting responses to the post-test wrap-up item “To what extent do you understand the process by which youth become radicalized online?”

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.01	0.07	.01	.08	-.16	.17	.932
Mentor	0.11	0.09	.13	.11	-.08	.34	.220
Coach	0.13	0.11	.15	.12	-.09	.40	.223
Advisor	-0.05	0.11	-.06	.13	-.31	.18	.611
Counselor	0.06	0.18	.07	.21	-.35	.49	.740
After school	0.10	0.07	.12	.08	-.04	.28	.145
Religion	0.01	0.11	.01	.13	-.24	.26	.914
Mental health professional	-0.01	0.13	-.01	.16	-.32	.30	.937
Age	0.004	0.003	.06	.04	-.02	.14	.154
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	0.10	0.07	.12	.08	-.03	.27	.124
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.12	0.14	-.14	.16	-.46	.18	.383
Black or African American	-0.03	0.11	-.04	.14	-.31	.23	.762
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.28	0.13	.34	.16	.03	.64	.033
Other / Mixed	0.05	0.10	.06	.12	-.17	.29	.607
Education	0.01	0.03	.02	.04	-.07	.10	.676
Household Income	0.01	0.01	.04	.04	-.04	.12	.324
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.12	0.13	.14	.15	-.17	.44	.377
Rural, in-town	0.34	0.12	.41	.15	.12	.70	.006
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.09	0.09	.11	.10	-.09	.31	.271
A small or medium-sized city	-0.05	0.09	-.06	.11	-.28	.16	.593
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.02	0.03	-.05	.06	-.18	.08	.457
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	-0.05	0.03	-.12	.06	-.25	.01	.063
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	0.10	0.12	.12	.14	-.17	.40	.413
Other	-0.24	0.17	-.28	.21	-.68	.13	.177
Did not vote	-0.04	0.10	-.04	.12	-.27	.18	.698
Constant	3.05	0.19	-.23	.13	-.50	.03	.083
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 698) = 1.62, p = .029, R^2 = .0549, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0210$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

To what extent do you feel prepared to talk with youth about online extremism?

Table 18. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting responses to the post-test wrap-up item “To what extent do you feel prepared to talk with youth about online extremism?”

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.05	0.08	.05	.08	-.11	.22	.511
Mentor	0.25	.010	.27	.11	.06	.47	.012
Coach	0.14	0.12	.15	.12	-.10	.39	.235
Advisor	-0.11	0.12	-.12	.13	-.37	.13	.331
Counselor	0.07	0.20	.08	.21	-.34	.49	.711
After school	0.11	0.08	.12	.08	-.04	.28	.141
Religion	-0.001	0.12	-.001	.13	-.25	.25	.993
Mental health professional	-0.02	0.15	-.02	.16	-.33	.29	.893
Age	0.01	0.003	.13	.04	.04	.21	.003
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	-0.07	0.07	-.08	.08	-.23	.08	.336
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.35	0.15	-.38	.16	-.69	-.06	.020
Black or African American	-0.08	0.13	-.09	.14	-.35	.18	.533
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.33	0.15	.36	.16	.05	.67	.022
Other / Mixed	-0.09	0.11	-.09	.12	-.33	.14	.422
Education	-0.0004	0.03	-.001	.04	-.09	.08	.988
Household Income	0.01	0.01	.04	.04	-.04	.12	.337
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.37	0.14	.39	.16	.09	.70	.011
Rural, in-town	0.17	0.14	.18	.15	-.10	.47	.210
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.05	0.09	.06	.10	-.14	.26	.568
A small or medium-sized city	-0.08	0.10	-.08	.11	-.30	.13	.454
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.03	0.04	-.06	.07	-.19	.07	.385
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	0.01	0.03	.02	.06	-.11	.15	.750
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	0.01	0.13	.01	.14	-.27	.30	.935
Other	-0.10	0.19	-.11	.21	-.52	.29	.591
Did not vote	-0.05	0.11	-.06	.12	-.28	.17	.631
Constant	2.66	0.21	-.09	.13	-.35	.17	.507
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 695) = 2.04, p = .002, R^2 = .0683, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0348$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

To what extent could you intervene with youth that you suspect are in contact with extremist values?

Table 19. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting responses to the post-test wrap-up item “To what extent could you intervene with youth that you suspect are in contact with extremist values?”

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.10	0.08	.11	.08	-.05	.28	.179
Mentor	0.32	0.10	.35	.11	.14	.56	.001
Coach	0.10	0.12	.11	.13	-.14	.35	.387
Advisor	-0.08	0.12	-.08	.13	-.33	.17	.523
Counselor	0.20	0.20	.21	.21	-.21	.63	.321
After school	0.07	0.08	.08	.08	-.08	.24	.346
Religion	-0.11	0.12	-.12	.13	-.37	.13	.348
Mental health professional	0.16	0.15	.17	.16	-.14	.48	.281
Age	0.01	0.003	.10	.04	.01	.18	.021
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	0.03	0.07	.03	.08	-.13	.18	.717
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.22	0.15	-.24	.16	-.56	.08	.144
Black or African American	0.02	0.123	.02	.14	-.25	.29	.872
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.09	0.15	.10	.16	-.21	.41	.544
Other / Mixed	0.02	0.11	.02	.12	-.21	.25	.850
Education	-0.001	0.03	-.001	.04	-.09	.08	.984
Household Income	0.01	0.01	.05	.04	-.02	.13	.168
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.30	0.14	.32	.16	.02	.63	.039
Rural, in-town	0.22	0.14	.24	.15	-.06	.53	.112
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.09	0.10	.10	.10	-.10	.30	.347
A small or medium-sized city	-0.06	0.10	-.06	.11	-.28	.16	.586
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.03	0.04	-.06	.07	-.19	.07	.358
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	0.02	0.03	.05	.06	-.08	.17	.486
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	0.08	0.14	.08	.15	-.20	.37	.573
Other	-0.11	0.19	-.12	.21	-.53	.29	.569
Did not vote	-0.02	0.11	-.02	.12	-.25	.21	.883
Constant	2.50	0.21	-.24	.14	-.51	.02	.073
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 699) = 1.63, p = .028, R^2 = .0550, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0213$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

To what extent do you know where to get help if you suspect a minor you know is coming into contact with extremist ideas?

Table 20. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting responses to the post-test wrap-up item “To what extent do you know where to get help if you suspect a minor you know is coming into contact with extremist ideas?”

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	-0.06	0.07	-.07	.08	-.23	-.23	.410
Mentor	0.26	0.09	.29	.11	.08	.08	.006
Coach	-0.01	0.11	-.01	.13	-.26	-.26	.922
Advisor	-0.02	0.11	-.03	.13	-.28	-.28	.825
Counselor	0.16	0.19	.18	.21	-.24	-.24	.391
After school	0.03	0.07	.03	.08	-.13	-.13	.704
Religion	-0.08	0.11	-.09	.13	-.34	-.34	.496
Mental health professional	-0.01	0.14	-.01	.16	-.32	-.32	.945
Age	0.01	0.003	.14	.04	.06	.06	.001
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	0.07	0.07	.08	.08	-.07	-.07	.306
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.08	0.14	-.09	.16	-.41	-.41	.585
Black or African American	-0.03	0.12	-.03	.14	-.30	-.30	.818
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.30	0.14	.35	.16	.03	.03	.029
Other / Mixed	-0.03	0.10	-.03	.12	-.26	-.26	.803
Education	-0.03	0.03	-.04	.04	-.13	-.13	.307
Household Income	0.002	0.01	.01	.04	-.07	-.07	.761
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.14	0.14	.16	.16	-.15	-.15	.315
Rural, in-town	0.04	0.13	.04	.15	-.25	-.25	.786
A suburb or exurb near a city	-0.02	0.09	-.02	.10	-.23	-.23	.822
A small or medium-sized city	-0.10	0.10	-.11	.11	-.33	-.33	.318
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.02	0.03	-.05	.07	-.18	-.18	.474
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	-0.04	0.03	-.08	.07	-.21	-.21	.228
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	0.08	0.13	.09	.15	-.20	-.20	.558
Other	0.03	0.18	.03	.21	-.38	-.38	.869
Did not vote	-0.08	0.10	-.09	.12	-.32	-.32	.445
Constant	3.09	0.20	-.04	.14	-.31	-.31	.752
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 696) = 1.51, p = .053, R^2 = .0515, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0174$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

To what extent could you use and apply the resources provided in the guide?

Table 21. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting responses to the post-test wrap-up item “To what extent could you use and apply the resources provided in the guide?”

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	0.03	0.07	.03	.08	-.13	.20	.685
Mentor	0.26	0.09	.31	.11	.10	.51	.004
Coach	0.11	0.11	.13	.13	-.12	.37	.315
Advisor	-0.09	0.11	-.10	.13	-.35	.15	.424
Counselor	0.08	0.18	.09	.21	-.33	.51	.679
After school	0.07	0.07	.08	.08	-.08	.24	.331
Religion	0.03	0.11	.04	.13	-.21	.29	.778
Mental health professional	0.15	0.14	.17	.16	-.14	.49	.272
Age	0.01	0.003	.11	.04	.03	.19	.007
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	0.17	0.07	.19	.08	.04	.35	.013
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.04	0.14	-.05	.16	-.37	.27	.760
Black or African American	-0.04	0.12	-.04	.14	-.31	.23	.753
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.20	0.13	.24	.16	-.07	.55	.128
Other / Mixed	-0.09	0.10	-.11	.12	-.34	.12	.348
Education	-0.02	0.003	-.03	.04	-.11	.06	.503
Household Income	-0.001	0.01	-.01	.04	-.08	.07	.888
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	0.12	0.13	.14	.16	-.16	.45	.353
Rural, in-town	0.26	0.13	.30	.15	.01	.59	.040
A suburb or exurb near a city	0.02	0.09	.02	.10	-.18	.22	.860
A small or medium-sized city	-0.06	0.09	-.07	.11	-.29	.15	.554
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.10	0.03	-.20	.07	-.33	-.07	.002
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	0.01	0.03	.03	.06	-.10	.16	.662
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	0.13	0.12	.15	.15	-.13	.44	.089
Other	0.02	0.18	.03	.21	-.38	.44	.888
Did not vote	-0.08	0.10	-.09	.12	-.32	.14	.447
Constant	3.14	0.19	-.27	.13	-.53	-.002	.048
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 698) = 2.18, p < .001, R^2 = .0724, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0391$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Considering all the material you read, how satisfied are you with the Community Guide to Online Radicalization?

Table 22. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicting responses to the post-test wrap-up item “Considering all the material you read, how satisfied are you with the Community Guide to Online Radicalization?”

Variable	b	SE _b	B	SE _B	95% CI _B		p
					LL	UL	
Caregiver Type							
Family	-0.10	0.07	-.11	.08	-.27	.05	.180
Mentor	0.15	0.09	.16	.10	-.04	.36	.117
Coach	-0.14	0.11	-.16	.12	-.40	.08	.190
Advisor	0.02	0.11	.02	.12	-.22	.26	.881
Counselor	0.03	0.19	.03	.21	-.38	.44	.888
After school	0.03	0.07	.03	.08	-.13	.19	.687
Religion	-0.13	0.11	-.14	.12	-.39	.10	.247
Mental health professional	0.19	0.14	.21	.15	-.09	.52	.166
Age	0.01	0.003	.14	.04	.006	.22	<.001
Sex (ref = male)							
Female	0.19	0.07	.21	.08	.06	.36	.006
Race / ethnicity (ref = White)							
Asian or Pacific Islander	-0.13	0.14	-.14	.16	-.45	.17	.365
Black or African American	0.05	0.12	.06	.13	-.20	.32	.658
Hispanic or Latino/Latina	0.23	0.14	.25	.15	-.05	.56	.097
Other / Mixed	-0.06	0.10	-.07	.11	-.30	.15	.539
Education	-0.07	0.03	-.11	.04	-.20	-.03	.007
Household Income	0.01	0.01	.05	.04	-.03	.12	.203
Environmental Density (ref = Large City)							
Rural, outside of town	-0.04	0.14	-.05	.15	-.34	.25	.765
Rural, in-town	0.08	0.13	.09	.14	-.20	.37	.551
A suburb or exurb near a city	-0.02	0.09	-.03	.10	-.22	.17	.793
A small or medium-sized city	-0.15	0.10	-.17	.11	-.38	.05	.128
Strength of Political Identity (Higher = Stronger Republican)	-0.05	0.03	-.09	.06	-.22	.03	.153
Strength of Political Orientation (Higher = More Right-wing)	-0.06	0.03	-.12	.06	-.24	.003	.056
2020 U.S. Presidential Election Vote (ref = Joe Biden)							
Donald Trump	-0.10	0.13	-.11	.14	-.39	.17	.436
Other	-0.42	0.18	-.47	.20	-.86	-.07	.021
Did not vote	-0.26	0.10	-.29	.11	-.51	-.07	.010
Constant	3.45	0.20	.04	.13	-.21	.30	.742
Model Fit Statistics	$F(25, 698) = 4.02, p < .001, R^2 = .1258, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .0945$						

Note. SE = standard error; For B model all continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis; CI = confidence intervals, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; ref = reference comparison group.

Appendix C: References

Tucker, Ian. “*Douglas Rushkoff: ‘I’m thinking it may be good to be off social media altogether.’*” The Guardian. February 12, 2016. While young people “have more facility with these networks and platforms as they are designed but they have less insight that they are designed environments” which often promote antisocial behaviors. www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/12/digital-capitalism-douglas-rushkoff.

Credits

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